THE FUTURE OF BLOCS: CHINA AND FRANCE
The most important political factor making duopolistic strategy obsolescent and forcing revisions of both American and Soviet foreign policy is the decline of bipolarity. Yesterday it was the East versus the West; today, each camp recognizes divisions in the other and attempts to exploit them, while trying to cure the rifts in its own camp. Soon, the significant political forces undermining the cohesion of the blocs will be widely recognized and accepted; then the door will be open to a broad range of new possibilities. This will be the most important turning point since the postwar shift of the U.S.S.R. from a "strange ally" to the prime antagonist.
Yesterday, the West felt challenged by the specter of one united international Communist movement, directed from the Kremlin, and the Soviets suspended, after years of futile attempts, any serious hope of driving a wedge between the Western allies. Today, the bloc concepts of East and West still dominate the vocabulary of statesmen and many political maneuvers, but their relevance to international reality is steadily declining.
Not so many years ago, any suggestion in the West of a significant Sino-Soviet dispute was met with disbelief or ridicule. The authors of a study published in 1957 for the distinguished Council on Foreign Relations under the title Moscow-Peking Axis, anticipated a durable union. Those who saw a rift developing were considered wishful thinkers, ill-informed, or the victims of Communist manipulation. "Even now surprisingly few politicians and political commentators