INTERVENTION FOR PROGRESS
Closely associated with the shift from duopoly to competition is a redistribution of resources and efforts among the instruments of foreign policy in both camps. It is the package, rather than the contents, that is significantly altered; some instruments are emphasized while others are largely downgraded. Often such modifications in emphasis rather than substance initially escape notice. Increasingly, however, the change becomes manifest. Both the U.S.S.R. and the United States have nearly shelved the use of nuclear weapons as active instruments of foreign policy as they have moved closer to a total stalemate on this level. And, as we have seen, the Communist camp, to the extent that it is Soviet directed, has reduced the use of armed subversion and placed more reliance on nonlethal low-risk means to advance its goals.
In recent years the West, too, has expanded and improved its nonarmed capabilities. The proportions of aid devoted to economic as opposed to military purposes have been greatly enlarged--whereas the ratio was about one to three in 1953, by 1963 it was approximately one to one; the Peace Corps was introduced; and more attention has been paid to the trade needs of the underdeveloped countries, as reflected, for instance, in American support of prices for coffee and other tropical agricultural products. These improvements in American nonarmed capabilities are usually viewed as increasing the U.S. ability to counter Communist efforts to exploit growing social tensions in the underdeveloped countries. Increased American contributions to the realization of basic human values, to the flight from hunger and the quest for education, are also highlighted. In the context of the present analysis,