Generalizing the Argument
Are the central premises of this study applicable to countries other than Argentina and Mexico? In the case of telecom privatization attempts, do we find in other cases a correlation between privatization success and autonomous government with high concentration of power in the executive? In other words, when less developed countries (LDCS) attempt to privatize their telecommunications industries, does success correlate with governmental autonomy and a powerful chief executive? When liberalization and privatization are attempted simultaneously, does success correlate with attractive domestic markets? To test the arguments presented earlier and to see if the causal links apparent in the experiences of Argentina and Mexico also occur elsewhere, this chapter briefly examines the experiences of other developing countries where telecom reform--even though attempted during this same historical period-- followed different paths. That is, some succeeded and some failed in their reform attempts.
The chapter looks at the experiences of five Latin American countries ( Chile, Colombia, Jamaica, Venezuela, and Uruguay), two Southeast Asian countries ( Thailand and Malaysia), and an African nation ( South Africa). 1 In all of these cases, the governments formally announced their intention to (partially or totally) privatize the national telecommunications enterprise. Most of the