or subdivision thereof, represented by the applicant or applicants, if the
President finds (1) that such associations or groups impose no inequitable
restrictions on admission to membership therein and are truly representative of such traits or industries or subdivisions thereof. . . ."
On the customary procedure in drafting the codes, see
Lyon and Associates, The National Recovery Administration, Washington,
D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1935, Part 2.
Pearce, op. cit., p. 2, App. D.
Of the first 500 codes approved, 79 per cent provided for "practices tending
to effect minimum prices"; 72 per cent for uniform methods of cost
finding; 59 per cent for open prices; 43 per cent for specified discount
and credit terms; 27 per cent for specified transportation terms; 22 per
cent for standard forms or terms of contract; 18 per cent for specified
forms or terms of, or conditions surrounding the making of bids and
quotations; 17 per cent for classification of customers.
Lyon and Associates, op. cit., p. 570.
Leverett S. Lyon and
Victor Abramson, The Economics of Open Price
, Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1936, p. 23
open price system, broadly conceived, involves the compilation and distribution among business rivals of statistical information on inventories,
orders, sales, shipments, prices, and like matters necessary for each to
make an informed decision on price and output. The filing of prices
currently charged by each producer is, however, the heart of the arrangement.
George W. Stocking and
Myron W. Watkins, Monopoly and Free Enterprise, New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1951, Chap. 7.
3. THE EMERGENCE AND NATURE OF
TRADE UNIONS ·
G. D. H. Cole
In Great Britain, there were already, in the eighteenth century, a
number of statutes forbidding workers' combinations in particular trades.
Moreover, the courts of law had shown a growing tendency to outlaw all
such combinations on the ground that their effect was to "restrain trade"
by interfering with the "natural" liberty of all men to dispose of their
labor as they wished. But, on account of the cumbrousness of the legal
procedure, these repressive measures were not very effective. The principal
purpose of the Combination Acts of 1799 and 1800 was to make them
more so, both by declaring unequivocally that combinations were unlawful
--indeed, criminal conspiracies against the public interest--and by providing simpler ways of proceeding against offenders. The campaign for
the Acts was begun by certain employers in the machine-making industries, who demanded that the combinations among their own skilled employees, the millwrights, should be suppressed. The cry was taken up by
anti-revolutionary politicians, who substituted for the particular measure
directed against the millwrights a general prohibition of all workers' industrial combinations; and this prohibition remained in force until 1824,
when, Napoleon having been defeated and the fear of revolution having