SINCE the time when, as a student of Professor Palmer at Harvard, I read Sidgwick Methods of Ethics, I have had the ambition to follow in a small way the plan of that great work, and to set forth as best I could the methods of logic and epistemology disentangled from the more exciting problems of metaphysics.
Sidgwick's book still seems to me one of the greatest of philosophic essays, and the misunderstandings and cross- purposes of contemporary philosophic discussion appear to call now even more strenuously than before for a segregation of the dialectical and methodological problems of philosophy from problems concerning the nature of reality. In the general plan of treatment as well as in the subtitle of my book I have registered my obligation to Sidgwick.
It is my pleasant duty to acknowledge thankfully the many helpful suggestions which I have received from Dr. Muirhead, the Editor of the Library, in the preparation of this book for the press. To Miss May Sinclair I am grateful for the clearer appreciation of Idealism which I have gained from discussions with her and from her writings. Thanks are also due to Professor R. B. Perry of Harvard who read and criticised the MS.; and to Professor John Dewey whose comments on the chapter on Pragmatism have cleared away some of the misconceptions which I had formerly entertained as to the relations of Instrumentalism to the logic and epistemology of Pragmatism as a whole.
To my friends Professors Lovejoy, Miller, Overstreet, and Sheldon I owe much in the way of encouragement and stimulus generously imparted through many years of delightful conversations and companionship.
Most of all I am indebted to my colleague Professor Helen