By comparison, Igor Zevelev and Sharyl Cross see Moscow's pro Serbian response to have been conditioned by:
historical and cultural ties between Russians and Serbs, similar destinies of the two nations after the breakups of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, adamant Serbian resistance to what is perceived as a global post Cold War Western offensive, Serbian appeals for Russian assistance, national interests considerations and domestic pressures within Russia.
Similarly, religious and cultural ties, as well as outstanding problems among them, explain Turkey's support for the Bosnian Muslims and Greece's pro Serbian position.
Finally, these divisions and differences in strategy, cultural and religious orientation, and national interests were reflected in the ineffectiveness of the United Nations' peacekeeping mission in Bosnia. E. Thomas Rowe sums up the international organization's "unfortunate dilemma" when he states "that the UN is most likely to be given responsibility when member states are reluctant unilaterally to take the risks or commit the resource."
It has been said that the Balkans -- and great power insistence on their role as Balkan mapmakers -- have produced more history than can consumed locally. Developments in the 1990s more than confirm that epigram. Let the authors of the essays that follow illuminate our understanding of this sensitive and troubled part of the world.