peacekeeping operation, implying consent, was pushed in the direction of enforcement actions against the Serbs.
Moreover, if it could not count on cooperation by the Bosnian Serbs in the performance of its functions, UNPROFOR needed to be a larger force with heavier weaponry than was established. To the extent UNPROFOR was expected to take enforcement actions against the Bosnian Serbs, it needed capabilities member states were unwilling to provide. For UN officials, trying to operate successfully with the resources provided, there was considerable frustration. At one point, the head of UN peacekeeping operations is reported to have said: "I believe the UN is being made a scapegoat. It is absolutely unfair when member states do not want to take the risks, when they do not want to commit the resources, but blame the UN for failure to act."37
All of this is not to say that UNPROFOR was a complete failure in Bosnia- Herzegovina. It was largely unsuccessful where its role required confrontation with the Bosnian Serbs. In those tasks where its third party status could be utilized and where more traditional peacekeeping and mediation functions were performed, it had some short term and limited successes.
From the perspective of the effectiveness and development of the United Nations, the most important conclusion to be drawn from the UN experience in the former Yugoslavia is that moving from peacekeeping to peace making and peace enforcement is risky and ought to be done only in restricted circumstances. The UN has been successful in enforcement activities, as "Desert Storm" indicates. However, the success in enforcement depended upon the central interest and role of the United States. Because Washington had a strong concern with protecting Kuwait and other interests in the Gulf region, it was willing to commit the overwhelming resources and military force necessary. "Desert Storm" was essentially an American operation with multilateral support and under UN auspices.
In Bosnia-Herzegovina, no major power had sufficient interest to take the risks or commit the resources necessary to confront militarily the Bosnian Serbs. In those circumstances, the UN was not given the capabilities to undertake that confrontation. UNPROFOR was unusually large and expensive as a traditional peacekeeping operation but it had neither the size nor the weaponry to carry out nontraditional peacemaking or enforcement tasks in the face of strong military resistance from the Bosnian Serbs. It was bound to be frustrated and, through its