Development theory has generated many objections to orthodox economics. For
instance, Boeke ( 1953), a colonial administrator-scholar who argued for the inapplicability of orthodox western economics to the analysis of South-east Asia, posited a
dual economy in which eastern and western systems were brought into relationships. Furnivall ( 1939), who deploys political economic analysis to plural societies,
notes that economic activity is lodged within culture and that what might be tagged
pure market behaviour is manifest only when there is an absence of common
cultural rules. In plural societies colonial administration is necessary, for without it
pure economic behaviour is asocial
. Also, Streeten and Myrdal (See Preston 1982)
offer a sophisticated institutional analysis of matters developmental and Wallerstein
( 1974) although using an orthodox idea of markets, lodges them in history and into
the extensive networks of world systems. (See also Schiel 1987.)
Dependency theory has thus routinely followed lines critical to orthodox economics. One figure who might stand for the whole 'school' is Celso Furtado whose
work travels a familiar path: from the attempt to deploy the neo-classical paradigm,
on to doubt about its usefulness in the Third World, through to complete disbelief
in its scientific status anywhere. (See Preston 1982.)
The German Historical School of List, Roscher, Hildebrand, Knies and Schmoller
lost out to the proponents of the Austrian School, a variant of emergent neo-
classicism. However, argues Swedberg, their empirical, historical, comparative and
evolutionary approach fed into the first generation of economic sociology; the
names to note being: Weber (most importantly), Simmel, Pareto and Durkheim.
On this idea generally, see J. Habermas ( 1971).
There is now a large body of material addressing this point: see for example Ted Honderich
( 1990), C. Pateman ( 1979), and A. MacIntyre ( 1981 and 1988).
Pheby reviews some of the debate sparked by this essay: it moves within the sphere
of 'philosophy of science'. This is not, so far as I can see, a helpful area of reflections: Feyerabend's point to the effect that Popper has occasioned the misdevelopment of
the whole debate seems to be correct ( 1978). Once we enter the confused realms of
empiricism, positivism, mitigated positivism and the varieties of post-empiricism,
any plausible claims about natural science and social science will become obscure
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