in the states. 316 Finally, for comparison, there is the number of states in each enactment grouping that had achieved, in at least one form or another, a 14-year age limit in manufacturing by 1909. 317
As can be seen from these figures, there is a very strong and sharp relationship between a state's effort to control child labor and the early enactment of mothers' pensions, a relationship that looks quite dramatic when compared to those produced by the political and economic variables. In all three cases, the relationships are in the hypothesized directions. Moreover, not only are the relationships strong, but also these variables are most strongly associated with the earliest enactments. They still do well with the South, too, where the party competition and economic development variables did best only at predicting the slowest enactors. 318 Theda Skocpol, for example, confirms the strong role played by middle-class women's clubs in supporting mothers' pensions, while independently verifying the importance of underlying child labor reforms. Skocpol writes:
Our statistical study revealed that the prior public policies and wage-labor-force characteristics of the various states in 1910 influenced how quickly they enacted mothers' pension laws after that. States with stricter child labor laws and higher levels of per capita expenditures on public schools in 1910 tended to enact mothers' pensions sooner. 319
The case studies demonstrate that enforcement variables seemed ultimately most important in predicting the timing and coverage of mothers' pension laws. 320
These results, of course, show only an association. They do not prove that child labor reform caused the enactment of mothers' pension legislation. The causal argument is reserved for the case studies introduced in the remaining chapters. Nevertheless, these results are at least highly consistent with the hypothesis, especially because of the ability of the child labor variables to differentiate between all three groups of enactors.