Government Structures in the U.S.A. and the Sovereign States of the Former U.S.S.R: Power Allocation among Central, Regional, and Local Governments

By James E. Hickey Jr.; Alexej Ugrinsky | Go to book overview
3.
In addition, a federal system of government enhances the ballot box pressures already inherent in a two-party political system. For example, popular changes adopted in one jurisdiction may spill over to another, not due to migration, but rather to perceived political pressures. The sitting party in the second jurisdiction may feel compelled to adopt the policy of the first jurisdiction to forestall its opposition from using the policy as an issue in a subsequent election.
4.
This assumes tax/expenditure bundles are determined by majority voting.
5.
Matching unconditional grants are all that will be necessary if taxes are benefit taxes. If taxes are other than benefit taxes, then unconditional grants will also be necessary. Due to space limitations, benefit taxes will be assumed and the discussion will focus on matching conditional grants.
6.
Brennan and Buchanan ( 1980), 16.
7.
It is argued that voting is unable to effectively constrain the Leviathan. See Brennan and Buchanan ( 1980, 20-23).
8.
Ibid., 182.
9.
It has been hypothesized, nevertheless, that increased decentralization could result in a higher level of government expenditure. Quoting the economic historian John Wallace , Oates ( 1985, 749) suggests that "since individuals have more control over public decisions at the local than at the state or national level, they will wish to empower the public sector with a wider range of functions and responsibility where these activities are carried out at more localized levels of government." See Grosmann and West ( 1994) for a criticism of this hypothesis.

REFERENCES

Brennan Geoffrey, and Buchanan James M. The Power to Tax. Analytical Foundations of a Fiscal Constitution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980.

Breton Albert. "A Theory of Government Grants." Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science 31 ( May 1965): 175-87.

Grossman Philip J. "Fiscal Decentralization and Government Size: An Extension." Public Choice 62 ( July 1989): 63-69.

-----. "Fiscal Decentralization and Public Sector Size in Australia." Economic Record 68 ( September 1992): 240-46.

Grossman Philip J., and West Edwin G. "Federalism and the Growth of Govennnent Revisited." Public Choice 79, Nos. 1-2 ( April 1994).

Joulfaian David, and Marlow Michael L. "Government Size and Decentralization: Evidence from Disaggregated Data." Southern Economic Journal 56 ( April 1990): 1094-102.

Marlow Michael L. "Fiscal Decentralization and Government Size." Public Choice 56 ( March 1988): 259-70.

Nelson Michael A. "An Empirical Analysis of State and Local Tax Structure in the Context of the Leviathan Model of Government." Public Choice 49 ( 1986): 283-94.

-----. "Searching for Leviathan: Comment and Extension." American Economic Review 77 ( March 1987): 198-204.

Oates Wallace. Fiscal Federalism. New York: Harcourt Bruce Jovanovich, 1972.

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