and, as he speaks of the judgment of taste, it is easy to suppose that he may have slipped from remarks about the nature of the grounds -- with which we have seen him to be fundamentally concerned in setting up the main flow of the Critique -- to remarks about the nature of the content that is judged on those grounds in setting out this more tributary issue.
Finally it should have become clear that there is no unique position that can be clearly marked as belonging to the Prolegomena. A number of different topics are there intertwined. Now, one fertile way of seeing the discussion of subjective and objective validity there is as embryonic of an account of truth that the first Critique singularly omitted to supply. (There, Kant simply says that we can take the correspondence theory as providing a nominal definition, and then goes on jestingly to deprecate anything else (A58/9, B82/3). A nominal definition merely holds a gap, though, and leaves the main work undone. What he protests at, however, is not an attempt to do it, but an attempt to do it that takes the form of supplying a criterion of truth.) I have suggested that what Kant may be driving at is that a sentence or judgment is true if and only if it is objectively valid. Since he insists that this idea is interchangeable with that of necessary universal validity (Prolegomena §19), the notion of truth will be understood in terms of judgments that compel universal assent once all relevant considerations are taken on board. When this idea is put together with the account which Kant proposes of a thing of beauty as one that provides us with universal and necessary delight, the judgment of taste will turn out to be true if and only if, when all relevant considerations have entered into play, assent is compelled to a claim that the object in question is so constituted that, when all the relevant considerations are brought to bear, ideal critics cannot but respond to it with delight. 16 That is, the objective validity of the judgment (scilicet its truth) depends on just the sort of universality and just the sort of subjectivity that Kant claims single it out from others.