|To injure another in his trade, business or property.|
|To restrain or block the avenues of trade or commerce.|
|To induce another to break his contract.|
Others admit that the ultimate object of the boycott, that of improving the condition of labor, might be a legal one, but declare that its immediate object is that of injury, and that the law can take cognizance only of this immediate object. Still other judges in this group pronounce the boycott illegal, not merely on the ground of injury, but because such injury is accompanied by malice or is without justifiable cause.
The second general class of judges emphasizes the illegal means employed -- threats, coercion, intimidation, violence, extortion, misrepresentation -- and proclaims the boycott's illegality because of the employment of one or more of these means. The question of whether a suppression of boycotts interferes with freedom of speech and of the press has brought forward special arguments. Let us analyze more closely the reasoning of the court.
Ignoring the charge that boycotting constitutes a nuisance, we find that the early courts were prone to argue that all combinations