Agitation and Agony
THE PRESIDENT had said he would work toward a realization of the Zionist dream. The Congress, which was on record on an individual basis in favor of fulfillment of that dream, could now perhaps push the President into action by passing a pro-Zionist resolution. In the closing weeks of 1944 debate began again on the shelved Wright-Compton and Wagner-Taft resolutions.
The revival of the debate was stimulated by a cloudy letter from Secretary of War Stimson to Senator Taft dated October 10, 1944 --at the height of the election campaign. Stimson had killed the resolutions the previous March on the grounds that "further action on them at this time would be prejudicial to the successful prosecution of the war." Now the Secretary of War had reviewed the situation, and had found "that there is still strong feeling on the part of many officers in my department that the passage of such a resolution would interfere with our military effort. However, I do feel that the military considerations which led to my previous action in opposing the passage of this resolution are not as strong a factor as they were then. In my judgment, political considerations now outweigh the military, and the issue should be determined upon the political rather than the military basis."
Did Stimson mean by "political considerations" the domestic tug-of-war over the Jewish vote in the forthcoming election? Did he mean the politics of Arab versus Jew in the Holy Land? Or, perhaps, the diplomatic-political complications of having Congress take a position on what was, really, an internal affair of the British government? Stimson did not clarify. But his letter indicated that the Pentagon, at least, would not again interfere. On