Executive Power and Soviet Politics: The Rise and Decline of the Soviet State

By Eugene Huskey | Go to book overview

2
PARTY-STATE RELATIONS

Cameron Ross

In recent years the Communist Party's fate has been developing in a truly tragic way. With the start of perestroika in society it gradually and then rapidly started lagging behind the changes taking place in the country. Having previously been the backbone of the state administration, the party was unable to find its place in the conditions of political pluralism and to overcome the conservative-bureaucratic nature of its structures. 1


Introduction

Before Gorbachev unleashed his radical political reforms in the summer of 1988, there were two major bureaucracies in the Soviet Union, one for the Communist Party and one for the Soviet state. In each bureaucracy, centralism ruled. Decisions that in other societies might have been taken at lower levels were continually pushed upwards, to the all-union Politburo, Central Committee, and secretariat within the party and to the USSR Supreme Soviet and Council of Ministers within the state (see Table 2.1). This extraordinary concentration of power in central party and state institutions, and especially in their executive organs, was guaranteed by a tightly-regulated flow of information, by a prohibition against organized factions, and by the emasculation of legislative bodies. Neither delegates to party conferences nor deputies in the state's system of soviets were able to restrain the executive leadership of the party and state.

At the apex of this leadership was the general secretary of the party, who chaired meetings of the Politburo and embodied political authority for the average Soviet citizen. The state contributed two senior members of the leadership. The prime minister, formally the chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, supervised over 100 ministries and state committees that comprised

-49-

Notes for this page

Add a new note
If you are trying to select text to create highlights or citations, remember that you must now click or tap on the first word, and then click or tap on the last word.
One moment ...
Default project is now your active project.
Project items

Items saved from this book

This book has been saved
Highlights (0)
Some of your highlights are legacy items.

Highlights saved before July 30, 2012 will not be displayed on their respective source pages.

You can easily re-create the highlights by opening the book page or article, selecting the text, and clicking “Highlight.”

Citations (0)
Some of your citations are legacy items.

Any citation created before July 30, 2012 will labeled as a “Cited page.” New citations will be saved as cited passages, pages or articles.

We also added the ability to view new citations from your projects or the book or article where you created them.

Notes (0)
Bookmarks (0)

You have no saved items from this book

Project items include:
  • Saved book/article
  • Highlights
  • Quotes/citations
  • Notes
  • Bookmarks
Notes
Cite this page

Cited page

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Buy instant access to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

(Einhorn, 1992, p. 25)

(Einhorn 25)

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Cited page

Bookmark this page
Executive Power and Soviet Politics: The Rise and Decline of the Soviet State
Table of contents

Table of contents

  • Title Page iii
  • Contents v
  • List of Tables vii
  • Acknowledgements ix
  • Introduction xi
  • Notes xiii
  • The State in Imperial Russia and the Ussr 1
  • 1: The Government in the Soviet Political System 3
  • 2: Party-State Relations 49
  • 3: Executive-Legislative Relations 83
  • Notes 98
  • 4: The Rise of Presidential Power Under Gorbachev 106
  • The State and the Economy 127
  • 5: The Ministry of Finance 129
  • 6: The Industrial Ministries 143
  • 7: The Agricultural Ministries 161
  • The State and Security 179
  • 8: The Ministry of Defense 181
  • 9: The Ministry of Internal Affairs 202
  • 10: The Administration of Justice: Courts, Procuracy, and Ministry of Justice 221
  • The State and the Future 247
  • 11: The Rebirth of the Russian State 249
  • Index 271
  • Contributors 281
Settings

Settings

Typeface
Text size Smaller Larger Reset View mode
Search within

Search within this book

Look up

Look up a word

  • Dictionary
  • Thesaurus
Please submit a word or phrase above.
Print this page

Print this page

Why can't I print more than one page at a time?

Help
Full screen
/ 282

matching results for page

    Questia reader help

    How to highlight and cite specific passages

    1. Click or tap the first word you want to select.
    2. Click or tap the last word you want to select, and you’ll see everything in between get selected.
    3. You’ll then get a menu of options like creating a highlight or a citation from that passage of text.

    OK, got it!

    Cited passage

    Style
    Citations are available only to our active members.
    Buy instant access to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn, 1992, p. 25).

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn 25)

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences."1

    1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

    Cited passage

    Thanks for trying Questia!

    Please continue trying out our research tools, but please note, full functionality is available only to our active members.

    Your work will be lost once you leave this Web page.

    Buy instant access to save your work.

    Already a member? Log in now.

    Author Advanced search

    Oops!

    An unknown error has occurred. Please click the button below to reload the page. If the problem persists, please try again in a little while.