further support to the notion that the elections of 1994 were marked by strong anti-Clinton and anti-Democratic party effects among white men.
Thus, for Democratic candidates the cumulative effect of mobilization and vote choice in the 1994 elections was that they were hit twice. First, important elements of their traditional coalition were less likely to vote, due in part to an apparent ambivalence toward the party. Secondly, those persons who were more mobilized to vote were, in turn, more likely to be angry toward Clinton and thus were more likely to vote for Republican candidates. Given these conditions, it is no surprise that the Congress underwent an historic change in party control in 1994.
Like the results of other studies of the 1994 elections, our findings do not bode well for President Clinton and the Democrats in 1996. Although the angry-white-male thesis, as it has been set forward by media analysts, does not appear to be real, it is clear that certain constituencies which supported Clinton and the Democrats in 1992 now appear to be more ambivalent and less mobilized than they were at that time. Those who were angry with the President, the Democrats, and the ideology associated with them--particularly white males--appear to have been more mobilized. When combined with the facts of a slow "generational replacement of older, more Democratic voters with younger, more Republican voters;" the apparently increasing conservative nature of the electorate more generally; and the advantage of incumbency for Republicans in Congress ( Tuchfarber et al. 1995: 13), the future for the Democrats does indeed seem bleak. From a strategic point of view at least, Democrats need to engage in something more ambitious and expansive than rearguard actions during the next two years, and beyond.