|3. ||The Bjorkoe Treaty of 1905.|
|4. ||Failure of William II's attempt to detach Russia from France.|
D. EFFECTS ON ENGLAND'S INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.
|1. ||Preservation of English neutrality and the Entente Cordiale.|
|2. ||Renewal ( 1905) of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.|
|a. ||Pledge of active assistance, instead of mere neutrality in case
one member should be involved in war in defense of its possessions in Far East or (added in 1905) India.|
|b. ||British recognition of Japan's paramount rights in Korea.|
|3. ||Favorable attitude of English government toward amicable settlement
of Anglo-Russian conflicts of interest.|
E. THE MOROCCO CRISIS OF 1905 (next section) AS AN INDIRECT RESULT
OF RUSSIA'S DEFEAT.
XII. THE MOROCCO CRISIS OF 1905 AND THE ALGECIRAS
References:-- * Gooch, 348
-68. * Marriott, ch. x, 201
-14. # Loreburn, How the War Came
. # Ward and
Gooch, III, 338
-41. Stuart. Morel, Ten Years of Secret Diplomacy
. Bishop, Theodore Roosevelt
. Debidour, II, 32
. Bourgeois and Pagès, 320
-7. Tardieu, Conférence d'Algéciras
. France, Livres jaunes,
Affaires du Maroc
. German Weissbuch
on Morocco. British Cmd. paper, Morocco No. 1 ( 1906)
. Brandenburg, ch. 9. Friedjung, II, chs. xix-xx.
Compare Part 3, VIII.
A. REVIEW OF MOROCCAN QUESTION (Part 3, VIII-E).
B. INTERNATIONAL SETTING OF THE CRISIS OF 1905.
|1. ||German desire to break up Entente Cordiale.|
|2. ||Weakness of Russia.|
|a. ||Russo-Japanese War.|
|b. ||Internal revolution.|
C. THE CRISIS AND THE ALLIANCES.
|1. ||Unexpected vigor of English diplomatic support of France (cf.
Asquith's denial that England offered to land 100,000 men in
|2. ||French acceptance of German-Moroccan demand for conference.|
|a. || Delcassé's opposition, and resignation.|
|b. ||Desire of French financiers, socialists, pacifists, to avoid war.|
|c. ||Danger of war to France, without Russian military aid.|
|d. || Roosevelt's secret intervention.|
|3. ||French diplomatic victory at Algeciras Conference.|
|a. ||Diplomatic solidarity of France, England, and Russia.|
|b. ||Italian solidarity with Entente Powers (see above IX).|
|c. ||Favorable attitude of smaller Powers.|
|d. ||Privileged position of France and Spain, by the Act of Algeciras.|
|4. ||Anglo-French naval and military "conversations," 1906.|