Syllabus on International Relations

By Parker Thomas Moon; Institute of International Education (New York, N.Y.) | Go to book overview

E. ANNEXATION OF BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA BY AUSTRIA-HUNGARY.
1. Occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina since 1878.
2. Provision for eventual annexation, in secret treaty of Three Emperors' League (see above, II-E-2-b).
3. Izvolsky-Aehrenthal secret bargain--Buchlau conversations.
4. The annexation of Bosnia Herzegovina.
5. Russian opposition.

F. RELATIONS BETWEEN AUSTRIA AND SERBIA.
1. Conflict between Yugoslav irredentism and Austrian aggression, as the fundamental element in the situation.
2. Earlier Serbian policy of alliance with Austria (see II-E-5) abandoned after Serbian revolution of 1903.
3. The tariff war ("pig war") between Austria and Serbia, 1905-7.
4. Culmination of grievances in 1908.
a. Serbian protest against annexation of Bosnia.
b. Serbian demand for outlet to Adriatic.
c. Serbian and Austrian mobilization.

G. THE EUROPEAN "BOSNIAN CRISIS" OF 1908-9.
1. Demand for an international conference by Russia, England, Italy, and France.
2. Austrian settlement with Turkey, Jan. 1908.
a. Turkish recognition of annexation.
b. Restoration of Novi-Bazar to Turkey.
c. Conference of all Powers rendered "unnecessary."
3. Continued danger of war between Austria and Serbia, backed by Russia.
4. German threat to Russia ("shining armor").
5. Serbian promise to recognize annexation and live "on good terms" with Austria.
6. Significance.
a. Austro-German diplomatic triumph.
b. Intense resentment in Serbia and Russia.
c. Russian lack of confidence in Anglo-French support.
d. Russian intrigues in Balkan states after 1908.

XVI. THE AGADIR CRISIS
References:--* Gooch, ch. xiv. * Anderson and Hershey, 401-7. * Seymour, 184-93. # Loreburn, How the War Came, 86-111. Morel, Ten Years of Secret Diplomacy. # Schmitt, England and Germany, 228-40, 303-45. Debidour, II, 125-63. Tardieu, Le mystère d'Agadir. Caillaux, Agadir. Marchand, Livre Noir. Siebert, 577-612. Bourgeois and Pagès. Brandenburg, ch. xiv. Friedjung, III, ch. xxix. Compare XII, above, and Part 3, VIII.
A. PRELIMINARIES.
1. Review of situation after 1906.
2. Casablanca affair.

-101-

Notes for this page

Add a new note
If you are trying to select text to create highlights or citations, remember that you must now click or tap on the first word, and then click or tap on the last word.
One moment ...
Default project is now your active project.
Project items
Notes
Cite this page

Cited page

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Buy instant access to cite pages or passages in MLA 8, MLA 7, APA and Chicago citation styles.

(Einhorn, 1992, p. 25)

(Einhorn 25)

(Einhorn 25)

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Note: primary sources have slightly different requirements for citation. Please see these guidelines for more information.

Cited page

Bookmark this page
Syllabus on International Relations
Table of contents

Table of contents

Settings

Settings

Typeface
Text size Smaller Larger Reset View mode
Search within

Search within this book

Look up

Look up a word

  • Dictionary
  • Thesaurus
Please submit a word or phrase above.
Print this page

Print this page

Why can't I print more than one page at a time?

Help
Full screen
Items saved from this book
  • Bookmarks
  • Highlights & Notes
  • Citations
/ 280

matching results for page

    Questia reader help

    How to highlight and cite specific passages

    1. Click or tap the first word you want to select.
    2. Click or tap the last word you want to select, and you’ll see everything in between get selected.
    3. You’ll then get a menu of options like creating a highlight or a citation from that passage of text.

    OK, got it!

    Cited passage

    Style
    Citations are available only to our active members.
    Buy instant access to cite pages or passages in MLA 8, MLA 7, APA and Chicago citation styles.

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn, 1992, p. 25).

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn 25)

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn 25)

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences."1

    1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

    Cited passage

    Thanks for trying Questia!

    Please continue trying out our research tools, but please note, full functionality is available only to our active members.

    Your work will be lost once you leave this Web page.

    Buy instant access to save your work.

    Already a member? Log in now.

    Search by... Author
    Show... All Results Primary Sources Peer-reviewed

    Oops!

    An unknown error has occurred. Please click the button below to reload the page. If the problem persists, please try again in a little while.