Syllabus on International Relations

By Parker Thomas Moon; Institute of International Education (New York, N.Y.) | Go to book overview

A. THE BALKAN ALLIANCE.
1. Nature and purpose of the alliance.
2. Russia as sponsor of the alliance.

B. FAILURE OF THE CONCERT.
1. General fear of disturbance in Balkans as peril to peace.
2. Joint note to Balkan allies.
a. Promise to promote reforms in Macedonia.
b. Threat to veto territorial changes.
3. Collective note to Turkey, demanding reforms in Macedonia.
4. Outbreak of war despite these efforts.

C. THE BALKAN WARS.
1. Military success of Balkan allies.
2. The Albanian crisis, Dec. 1912--y Jan. 1913.
a. Austrian and Italian objections to Serbian outlet to Adriatic through Albania.
b. Russian diplomatic support of Serbia and partial mobilization against Austria; Austrian counter-mobilization.
c. Serbian consent to independent Albania and demand for compensation in Macedonia.
3. Montenegrin crisis, April- May 1913.
a. Austria's opposition to Montenegrin siege of Skutari.
b. Montenegro's renunciation of Skutari at bidding of Great Powers.
4. Treaty of London, May 30, 1913, terminating first war.
5. Second Balkan War.
a. Dispute over division of Macedonia.
b. Serbo-Greek alliance against Bulgaria.
c. Austrian encouragement of Bulgaria.
d. Outbreak of Second Balkan War, June 1913.
e. Entry of Turkey and Rumania, against Bulgaria.
f. Treaty of Bucharest, Aug. 10, 1913.

D. AUSTRIAN PROPOSAL TO TAKE ACTION AGAINST SERBIA.
1. Necessity, under Triple Alliance, of previous agreement with Italy.
2. Proposal to Italy for "defensive action" to prevent further aggrandizement of Serbia ( Aug. 9, 1913, according to Giolitti's speech; but more probably July 9, as in Pribram, II, 176-7).
3. Italy's refusal to sanction the plan.

E. SUMMARY OF EFFECTS.
1. Triple Alliance weakened by defeat of its protégés, Turkey and Bulgaria.
2. Austrian fear that Rumania's loyalty to Triple Alliance (see above, II-E-4) was being undermined by Russian diplomacy.
3. Enlargement and aggressiveness of Serbia, Austria's potential enemy and Russia's protégé.
4. Strengthening of Serbia by alliance with Greece.
5. Austrian fear of Serbian irredentism and pan-Slavism.
6. Austro-German fear of "encirclement."

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