AS LONG as the U.S. government felt that the opportunity existed to impose monopolistic financial terms upon the new Chinese republic, it was willing to stand with the other powers in denying diplomatic recognition to the recalcitrant regime. This policy of withholding recognition until the Chinese came to terms that were satisfactory to the international financiers was perceived as a departure from American custom and tradition.1 It drew intense but initially futile criticism from various domestic interest groups. By the time of the 1911 Revolution in China, the United States had come to accept fully the selfinterested aspects of recognition. In Latin America, for example, this diplomatic device had been used to foster or, alternatively, to undermine, regimes whose presence affected vital American interests. In the case of revolutionary China, American leaders would use recognition to gain protection for American citizens, property, and trade and to enhance America's position in the six-power consortium. American leaders, however, were not willing to reveal their whole agenda for China to the American people but preferred to mask some of their purposes in high-flown, prodemocratic, prorepublican rhetoric that did not correspond with actual U.S. policy.
Caution marked the initial response of American diplomats in China to revolutionary developments there and to the question of rec-