Unconventional Conflicts in a New Security Era: Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam

By Sam C. Sarkesian | Go to book overview
7.
See Ziegler, pp. 467-81, and U.S. General Accounting Office, Somalia: Observations Regarding the Northern Conflict and Resulting Conditions ( Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, May 1989).
8.
No attempt is made here to offer a detailed study of the myriad problems in the Third World. There is vast literature on these matters ranging from theoretical approaches to case studies. A useful starting point is Clark, cited above. According to at least one study, there is a "close relationship between political instability and level of modernization [as measured by a number of socioeconomic indexes]," p. 107.
9.
Again, there are some scholars who fail to see this link and yet are hardly persuasive in identifying sources of unconventional conflicts. See, for example, Shafer. For a view linking these matters see, for example, Lewis B. Ware, Low-Intensify Conflict in the Third World (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, August 1988), especially pp. 167-73. Also see Samuel B. Payne Jr., The Conduct of War: An Introduction to Modern Warfare ( New York: Basil Blackwell, 1989), pp. 229-37.
10.
See, for example, Myron Weiner and Samuel P. Huntington, eds., Understanding Political Development ( Boston: Little, Brown, 1987); and Chalmers Johnson, Revolutionary Change, 2nd ed. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982).
11.
White House, National Security Strategy of the United States ( Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 1990), p. 28.
12.
See General Carl W. Stiner, "The Strategic Employment of Special Operations Forces", Military Review, vol. 71, no. 6 ( June 1991), pp. 2-13.
13.
R. J. Rummel, From 'Political Systems, Violence, and War,' in United States Institute of Peace Journal, vol. 1, no. 4 ( September 1988), p. 6.
14.
Glenn P. Hastedt, American Foreign Policy: Past, Present, and Future (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1988), p. 323-24.
15.
Stephen Van Evera, "The Case Against Intervention", Atlantic, July 1990, p. 72.
16.
Robert W. Tucker, The Just War: A Study of Contemporary American Doctrine ( Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1960), p. 11.
17.
For examples of differing views and perspectives, see Harry G. Summers Jr., On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1981); John G. Stoessinger, Why Nations Go To War ( New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), 5th ed., pp. 84-115; Shafer, pp. 214-90; and Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr., The Army and Vietnam ( Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).
18.
Sam C. Sarkesian, America's Forgotten Wars: The Counterrevolutionary Past and Lessons for the Future (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1984).
19.
White House, National Security Strategy of the United States, p. 6.
20.
Discriminate Deterrence, Report of the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy ( Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 1988), p. 13.
22.
White House, National Security Strategy of the United States ( Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, August 1991), p. 7.
23.
National Military Strategy of the United States ( Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 1992), p. 17.
24.
See C. Kenneth Allard, Command, Control, and the Common Defense ( New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990).
25.
See, for example, Sam C. Sarkesian, The New Battlefield: The United States and Unconventional Conflicts (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1986).
26.
Grant T. Hammond, "Low-Intensity Conflict: War by Another Name", Small Wars & Insurgencies, vol. 1, no. 3 ( December 1990), p. 236.

-22-

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Unconventional Conflicts in a New Security Era: Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam
Table of contents

Table of contents

  • Title Page iii
  • Contents v
  • Illustrations vii
  • Preface ix
  • Notes xi
  • Part I - Introduction 1
  • 1 - Conflict Analysis: The Comparative Framework 3
  • Notes 22
  • Part II - Comparative Analysis 25
  • 2 - The State of the Nation: Great Britain, the United States, and Unconventional Conflicts 27
  • Notes 53
  • 3 - Military Posture and Nature of Conflict: Malaya 55
  • Notes 76
  • 4 - Military Posture and Nature of Conflict: The Diem Period in Vietnam 79
  • Notes 93
  • 5 - Military Posture and Nature of Conflict: The United States and the Second Indo-China War 95
  • Notes 119
  • 6 - Nature of Indigenous Systems: Revolutionary Systems 123
  • Notes 136
  • 7 - Nature of Indigenous Systems: Counterrevolutionary Systems 137
  • Notes 161
  • 8 - Conclusions: Malaya and Vietnam 165
  • Part III - Conclusions: What Needs to Be Done 183
  • 9 - The United States and the Emerging Security Agenda 185
  • Notes 198
  • Selected Bibliography 201
  • Index 217
  • About the Author 227
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