However much the President hated war, it was evident from the time of his quarantine speech that he hated neutrality more. Every move of the Administration was calculated to bring greater and greater support to Britain. In his message to Congress in January, 1938, he appealed for a big navy. Alarmed at this straight drive to war, former President Hoover began his series of warning broadcasts to the people to avoid alliances and to keep out of war, and presented his case in " Shall We Send Our Youth to War?" ( Coward-McCann, 1939).
In August, the President dramatized the fear of imminent danger by assuming the defense of Canada. "I give you my assurance that the people of the United States will not stand idly by if domination of Canadian soil is threatened by any other empire."
This same month, a joint communique of Great Britain and the United States anounced "that the two governments had agreed to set up a regime for the use in common" of Canton and Enderbury Islands. That the preliminary steps had been taken the year before at about the time of the President's 'quarantine' speech remained unknown until revealed a year and a half later by George Holden Tinkham, Representative from Massachusetts, in a speech fully documented with correspondence with the State Department ( Congressional Record, March 21, 1940). (cf pp 305-312, 455 and "What Makes Lives", p 160)
That same summer of 1938, Tinkham cabled from Europe to the President and Secretary Hull, charging that the Administration, then following a policy of 'parallel action', was in secret collusion with Britain, and demanding action. In a release January 29, 1940, he charged, "They sent American officials to Czechoslovakia in 1938 to support Great Britain in the political crisis there which eventuated in the Munich Settlement, and again the United States was involved in the humiliating and disastrous denouement." (cf p 312)
Lord Runciman, this same August, 1938, had settled down in Prague, for some months deep in diplomacy. "They sent out the Runciman Mission to see if there was not some 'painless' way of prying the Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia. . . . It was Chamberlain, not Hitler, who