|1.||For a more detailed discussion of the doctrine of "massive retaliation" see the author's Military Policy and the Defense of the Grey Areas, Foreign Affairs, April 1955.|
|2.||Paul Nitze, "Atoms, Strategy and Policy," Foreign Affairs, January 1956.|
|3.||See, for example, Thomas K. Finletter letter to the New York Herald Tribune, December 22; 1955.|
|4.||For application of these ideas to the conduct of a military campaign, see Richard C. Leghorn, "No Need to Bomb Cities to Win Wars," U.S. News U+000- World Report, January 28, 1955.|
|5.||For example, Rear Admiral Sir Anthony W. Buzzard , Manchester Guardian, November 3, 1955.|
Milton Mankoff and Linda Majka . Economic sources of American militarism.
Since the end of World War II, the American government has expended over +ACQ-1 trillion on military preparedness and activity. The belief that war profiteers are largely responsible for the enormous military expenditures of the federal government, and are also principal architects of military activity around the world, has long preoccupied social critics. The famous Special Committee on Investigation of the Munitions Industry, chaired by Senator Gerald Nye, conducted a lengthy investigation in the 1930s to uncover the extent and effect of war profiteering in the United States during World War I. It rejected the notion that arms manufacturers caused war. Nevertheless, by having a vested interest in military production and by stimulating an arms race through indiscriminate sale of the instruments of war to governments throughout the world, producers of weapons were held by congressional analysts to have contributed to a war psychology.
The current concern with war profiteering, while similar in many respects to that which motivated Senator Nye and his colleagues, assumes greater significance insofar as a military sector of the economy has taken on characteristics of permanence since the end of World War II. Whereas pre-