LINGUISTIC PHILOSOPHY IS, amongst other things, a theory of language. In essence, it consists of seeing language naturalistically. Language is a natural thing, an activity undertaken by concrete men in concrete contexts. As already indicated, the force of this view is best appreciated if one stresses what this view denies.
This view denies that language is, in fact or in principle or in some hidden way, a mirror of reality, a mirror such that, from the nature of the basic constituents of language, one could infer the basic constituents of reality. Some view of this kind was tacitly assumed, it is said, by much of past philosophy: if linguistic philosophers are right, this was the crucial error of past philosophers, and the fact that the human mind is given to this type of error is the basis of all or most (past, mistaken) philosophy, whilst the essence of good (linguistic) philosophy is the elimination of the manifold errors springing from that key mistake.
It has often been said that man in the past saw nature, and God, in his own image. It now also appears that he saw things in the image of his own language. So the overcoming of logomorphism supplements the overcoming of anthropomorphism.
The new view also denies that language could be such a mirror of reality and hence clue to its basic constituents. This view asserts not merely that natural languages are simply sets of activities of a certain kind in which men engage with concrete ends in mind and in concrete circumstances; it also asserts that language is inescapably, essentially, a class of doings of this kind. No fundamental logical skeleton underlies the manifold doings of concrete speakers. No logically constructed language could replace actual kinds of speech and claim some kind of priority.
This type of view of language, or attitude towards its philosophic significance, is communicated by linguistic philosophers