In the last chapter we explored the vicissitudes of the economic conception of citizenship. This view is based on the idea that we cannot expect that citizens will be moved by anything other than self-interest. After reviewing a standard list of these views, our conclusion was that such theories are generally self-defeating and that this conception of what can be expected of citizens is false.
In this chapter we start from a different angle. Instead of defining what can be expected from citizens first and then determining what notion of the role of citizens is compatible with this, I define an appropriate role for citizens that accords with the principles of democratic equality defended in Chapter 2 and then determine whether this role demands too much or too little from citizens. This approach is justified by two key results of the previous chapter. First, citizens are moved by moral principles to some extent, and, second, if citizens are not moved by moral principles there is little reason for engaging in the process of defining the role of citizenship anyway because such theories will tend to be self-defeating. Since citizens are moved by moral principle it is reasonable to attempt to define and defend a set of moral principles before we say what we can expect from citizens. A conception of the role of citizens that accords with the principle of democratic equality outlines the rights and du-