but of an extrachance number of them. It would be comparatively unimportant which calls were correct and whether the subject knew which were correct as long as there was an extrachance number of them. In this approach, then, an explanation would refer to the conditions regularly connected with an extrachance number of hits rather than being concerned with how an individual correct call was obtained.
Finally, indications are that the concept of guessing fits the experimental findings. (For overviews of the findings, see, for example, J. B. Rhine, 1954, 6 or L. E. Rhine, 1971. 7) For instance, guesses are always at or about something, and clairvoyance is always directed at something, its target. Distance does not influence guessing, which fits the lack of distance effects in clairvoyance. Indeed, the lack of distance effects might be taken as evidence supporting an analysis in terms of guessing. Moreover, if the phenomena were so analyzed, the lack of distance effects would not be a problem at all. It would be expected, for guessing is uninfluenced by distance. In addition, it would normally be expected that guessing and a person's willingness to guess would be influenced by the overall situation in which he would make his guesses. This fits findings that the experimental context, the attitude of the experimenter, and the attitude and personality of the subject influence performance.
The concept of guessing is appropriate to experimental clairvoyance. An analysis of the phenomenon in terms of guessing obviates certain problems, clarifies others, and fits the experimental results, all of which suggest its potential value. Whether in fact it will be useful can only be seen by its fruitfulness in suggesting new directions for thought, new experiments to perform, and new ways to systematize the phenomenon.