unconscious inference). I recognize that this position may get uncomfortable if there is strong evidence for precognition of such events as the death of a stranger, or of some disaster like an earthquake.
It boils down to the question: which of the rival interpretations of these awkward facts is the least irrational to accept? In view of the extent to which accepting the concept of precognition would violate the basic structure of our thought, I feel constrained to vote against it. Perhaps I should add, to prevent misunderstanding, that I have no objection to the continued use of the word "precognition"(which it is doubtless too late to erase from our vocabulary), so long as this is given an operational definition. We might define "a precognition experiment" as one in which a subject is asked to predict the outcome of randomizing procedure in circumstances which preclude the subject from inferring or controlling the outcome by any method which we can understand.