Games Real Actors Play: Actor-Centered Institutionalism in Policy Research

By Fritz W. Scharpf | Go to book overview

about the capacity of different types of institutional structures to deal effectively with different types of policy problems. These are large claims that can only be justified through the successful explanation of important puzzles in empirical policy research. The present book is not intended to do this. Its main concern is the presentation and explication of the tools that could be used in such work.


NOTES
1.
Burns et al. ( 1985, 7) appropriately characterize the integrative intent of their own approach by opposing it to James S. Duesenberry's famous quip that "economics is all about how people make choices. Sociology is about why they don't have any choices to make."
2.
The neorealist theory of international relations, it is true, also tries to get much mileage out of assumptions specifying the relevant actors (nation-states), their preferences (to maximize relative gains in the balance of power), their perceptions (empirically accurate), and their mode of interaction (noncooperative games). It is clear that these assumptions, if generally correct, would greatly reduce the need for empirical data -- but it has also been pointed out that empirical research has mainly found them to be very poor predictors ( Moravcsik 1992 and the studies cited there).
3.
There is a philosophically and psychologically important debate on whether these beneficial effects should be conceptualized as external constraints (or negative and positive incentives) that do not affect the intrinsic preferences of self-interest-maximizing actors, or whether norms and values should be construed as a type of actor orientation that is logically distinct from self-interest ( Elster 1991) -- with the implication that the intrinsic preferences of individuals may be transformed by the socialization effect of institutions. Freud ( 1915), for instance, distinguished sharply between the control of egotistic drives through positive and negative incentives (which would cease to be effective when controls are removed), and their "civilization" through the internalization of cultural norms. However, since we are not primarily concerned with individual action but rather with collective and corporate actors, whose goals can clearly be shaped by the rules that constitute them, the resolution of this dispute one way or another is not of paramount importance for policy research.
4.
By contrast, we should not claim the ability to predict policy outcomes. Given the pervasiveness of "Cournot effects" (i.e., the accidental intersection of unrelated chains of causation) in social and political interactions ( Lübbe 1975; Boudon 1984; Mayntz 1995), even theoretically well-founded predictions may turn out to be wrong -- which does not invalidate the usefulness of the same knowledge for design purposes.
5.
The plural form is used to indicate that there will often be separate interactions, such as voting in two chambers of a legislature, linked through negotiations in a conference committee, that produce the outcome.
6.
This includes the ability of ego, who has control over outcomes that are of interest to alter, to influence alter, who in turn has control over the outcome that is of interest to ego. That is the essence of Coleman's concept of a political exchange ( 1990, chap. 6), which has strongly influenced the research on policy networks.
7.
It has also been suggested that Theodore Lowi's suggestive typology of distributive, regulatory, and redistributive policies could be reformulated in terms of different types of

-49-

Notes for this page

Add a new note
If you are trying to select text to create highlights or citations, remember that you must now click or tap on the first word, and then click or tap on the last word.
One moment ...
Default project is now your active project.
Project items

Items saved from this book

This book has been saved
Highlights (0)
Some of your highlights are legacy items.

Highlights saved before July 30, 2012 will not be displayed on their respective source pages.

You can easily re-create the highlights by opening the book page or article, selecting the text, and clicking “Highlight.”

Citations (0)
Some of your citations are legacy items.

Any citation created before July 30, 2012 will labeled as a “Cited page.” New citations will be saved as cited passages, pages or articles.

We also added the ability to view new citations from your projects or the book or article where you created them.

Notes (0)
Bookmarks (0)

You have no saved items from this book

Project items include:
  • Saved book/article
  • Highlights
  • Quotes/citations
  • Notes
  • Bookmarks
Notes
Cite this page

Cited page

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Buy instant access to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

(Einhorn, 1992, p. 25)

(Einhorn 25)

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Cited page

Bookmark this page
Games Real Actors Play: Actor-Centered Institutionalism in Policy Research
Table of contents

Table of contents

  • Title Page v
  • Contents ix
  • Tables and Figures xi
  • Acknowledgments xv
  • Introduction 1
  • Notes 18
  • 1 - Policy Research in the Face of Complexity 19
  • Notes 34
  • 2 - Actor-Centered Institutionalism 36
  • Notes 49
  • 3 - Actors 51
  • Notes 67
  • 4 - Actor Constellations 69
  • Notes 93
  • 5 - Unilateral Action in Anarchic Fields and Minimal Institutions 97
  • Notes 114
  • 6 - Negotiated Agreements 116
  • Notes 147
  • 7 - Decisions by Majority Vote 151
  • Notes 168
  • 8 - Hierarchical Direction 171
  • Notes 193
  • 9 - Varieties of the Negotiating State 195
  • Notes 214
  • Appendix 1 - A Game-Theoretical Interpretation of Inflation and Unemployment in Western Europe 217
  • Notes 237
  • References 240
  • Appendix 2 - Efficient Self-Coordination in Policy Networks -- a Simulation Study 245
  • Notes 273
  • References 276
  • References 281
  • About the Book and Author 303
  • Index 305
Settings

Settings

Typeface
Text size Smaller Larger Reset View mode
Search within

Search within this book

Look up

Look up a word

  • Dictionary
  • Thesaurus
Please submit a word or phrase above.
Print this page

Print this page

Why can't I print more than one page at a time?

Help
Full screen
/ 318

matching results for page

    Questia reader help

    How to highlight and cite specific passages

    1. Click or tap the first word you want to select.
    2. Click or tap the last word you want to select, and you’ll see everything in between get selected.
    3. You’ll then get a menu of options like creating a highlight or a citation from that passage of text.

    OK, got it!

    Cited passage

    Style
    Citations are available only to our active members.
    Buy instant access to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn, 1992, p. 25).

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn 25)

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences."1

    1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

    Cited passage

    Thanks for trying Questia!

    Please continue trying out our research tools, but please note, full functionality is available only to our active members.

    Your work will be lost once you leave this Web page.

    Buy instant access to save your work.

    Already a member? Log in now.

    Author Advanced search

    Oops!

    An unknown error has occurred. Please click the button below to reload the page. If the problem persists, please try again in a little while.