Games Real Actors Play: Actor-Centered Institutionalism in Policy Research

By Fritz W. Scharpf | Go to book overview

It might seem empirically more appropriate, in comparison, to interpret elections merely as allowing voters to exercise what William Riker ( 1982, 244) described as "the veto by which it is sometimes possible to restrain official tyranny." That is perhaps too pessimistic a view. Nevertheless, popular elections are generally not about the selection of policy choices but about the legitimation and control of the hierarchical authority of governments and other policymaking agencies. This function will be discussed in the following chapter.


NOTES
1.
Under certain conditions, it is true, the cost of negative sanctions may be lowered by the existence of asymmetrical exchange relationships in which alter depends on resources that ego may grant or withhold. Over time, however, asymmetrical exchange tends to develop toward more symmetrical relationships of mutual dependence in which unilateral boycott will gradually become more costly and hence less feasible ( Emerson 1962).
2.
The classical model of this problem is of course Reinhard Selten ( 1978) famous "chain-store paradox".
3.
Thus the Nazi regime in Germany relied very much on the pretense of rule-based power in order to disarm its victims.
4.
Niklas Luhmann ( 1969, 32-37) adds the important argument that compliance, in order to be effective, requires that ego accept alter's decision premises even if these do not agree with ego's own perceptions and preferences -- which would undercut the presentation of self-identities unless compliance is also morally supported by the relevant reference group.
5.
David Held ( 1987, 182) distinguishes seven grounds for compliance: (1) coercion, (2) tradition, (3) apathy, (4) pragmatic acquiescence, (5) instrumental acceptance, (6) normative agreement, and (7) ideal normative agreement. He considers only the last two as being instances of legitimacy -- and indeed, they are the only ones that assure compliance in cases in which decisions go against the self-interest of target actors and in which the risk of violations' being detected is low. An instructive example is provided by Margaret Levi's ( 1988) description of the extraordinary efforts that the Australian government needed to expend in order to reestablish tax compliance, which had been undercut by reports of large-scale tax evasion by high-income taxpayers. For exactly the same reasons the legitimacy of the tax system is now being challenged in Germany.
6.
Where individual agreement is meaningful and possible, input-oriented legitimacy is better described as being contractual in character. The description becomes ideological, however, if it is applied to collective-choice constellations under conditions in which exit is costly or impossible.
7.
Analytically the argument presupposes that there is a "correct" solution, that all voters will sincerely and independently vote for their own perception of the true solution, and that there is a positive probability that any individual voter is likely to perceive the true solution. When that is assumed, the likelihood that truth will be discovered increases with the number of votes cast for a solution according to the "Condorcet Jury Theorem" ( Michaud 1988).
8.
This seems to be the constellation that was assumed by the authors of the Federalist Papers ( Cooke 1961), who were much impressed with the conflict of interest between the

-168-

Notes for this page

Add a new note
If you are trying to select text to create highlights or citations, remember that you must now click or tap on the first word, and then click or tap on the last word.
One moment ...
Default project is now your active project.
Project items

Items saved from this book

This book has been saved
Highlights (0)
Some of your highlights are legacy items.

Highlights saved before July 30, 2012 will not be displayed on their respective source pages.

You can easily re-create the highlights by opening the book page or article, selecting the text, and clicking “Highlight.”

Citations (0)
Some of your citations are legacy items.

Any citation created before July 30, 2012 will labeled as a “Cited page.” New citations will be saved as cited passages, pages or articles.

We also added the ability to view new citations from your projects or the book or article where you created them.

Notes (0)
Bookmarks (0)

You have no saved items from this book

Project items include:
  • Saved book/article
  • Highlights
  • Quotes/citations
  • Notes
  • Bookmarks
Notes
Cite this page

Cited page

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Buy instant access to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

(Einhorn, 1992, p. 25)

(Einhorn 25)

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Cited page

Bookmark this page
Games Real Actors Play: Actor-Centered Institutionalism in Policy Research
Table of contents

Table of contents

  • Title Page v
  • Contents ix
  • Tables and Figures xi
  • Acknowledgments xv
  • Introduction 1
  • Notes 18
  • 1 - Policy Research in the Face of Complexity 19
  • Notes 34
  • 2 - Actor-Centered Institutionalism 36
  • Notes 49
  • 3 - Actors 51
  • Notes 67
  • 4 - Actor Constellations 69
  • Notes 93
  • 5 - Unilateral Action in Anarchic Fields and Minimal Institutions 97
  • Notes 114
  • 6 - Negotiated Agreements 116
  • Notes 147
  • 7 - Decisions by Majority Vote 151
  • Notes 168
  • 8 - Hierarchical Direction 171
  • Notes 193
  • 9 - Varieties of the Negotiating State 195
  • Notes 214
  • Appendix 1 - A Game-Theoretical Interpretation of Inflation and Unemployment in Western Europe 217
  • Notes 237
  • References 240
  • Appendix 2 - Efficient Self-Coordination in Policy Networks -- a Simulation Study 245
  • Notes 273
  • References 276
  • References 281
  • About the Book and Author 303
  • Index 305
Settings

Settings

Typeface
Text size Smaller Larger Reset View mode
Search within

Search within this book

Look up

Look up a word

  • Dictionary
  • Thesaurus
Please submit a word or phrase above.
Print this page

Print this page

Why can't I print more than one page at a time?

Help
Full screen
/ 318

matching results for page

    Questia reader help

    How to highlight and cite specific passages

    1. Click or tap the first word you want to select.
    2. Click or tap the last word you want to select, and you’ll see everything in between get selected.
    3. You’ll then get a menu of options like creating a highlight or a citation from that passage of text.

    OK, got it!

    Cited passage

    Style
    Citations are available only to our active members.
    Buy instant access to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn, 1992, p. 25).

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn 25)

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences."1

    1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

    Cited passage

    Thanks for trying Questia!

    Please continue trying out our research tools, but please note, full functionality is available only to our active members.

    Your work will be lost once you leave this Web page.

    Buy instant access to save your work.

    Already a member? Log in now.

    Author Advanced search

    Oops!

    An unknown error has occurred. Please click the button below to reload the page. If the problem persists, please try again in a little while.