We understand that our book does not provide the reader with a comprehensive and detailed analysis of the totality of the arms control and disarmament decision-making process in the former Soviet Union. We have not managed to include a retrospective of such important arms control areas as the negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions in Europe (MBFR), confidence building measures (CBMs), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and other negotiations of which we had no firsthand knowledge. Questions related to these issues can better become the subject of additional or special studies made by other authors. We have written of what we know, and we know that other participants will eventually write their own chapters; we only hope that this will occur before memories dim, so as to memorialize, so to speak, the contributions of hundreds of "players" on both sides.
We also realize that there can be more than one explanation for the events described in this book, which can be viewed from either a Western or a Soviet viewpoint, or from a more neutral standpoint. Alternatively, they can be viewed with regard to the most dramatic events, those connected with radical changes in the Soviet approach to the security problems and, therefore, with changes in the Soviet official positions at the