Soviet Policy toward East Germany Reconsidered: The Postwar Decade

By Ann L. Phillips | Go to book overview

to represent the interests of all the German people in international affairs. ( 171) In truth, Adenauer had abandoned his demand for free, all-German elections as the price for establishing diplomatic relations. ( 172) Throughout the deliberations, the Soviets emphasized development of mutually advantageous economic relations, leaving the question of reunification for the Germans to resolve. ( 173) A communique issued 13 September announced agreement of both governments to establish diplomatic relations, set up embassies, and exchange Ambassadors. ( 174)

Within days, Soviet and East German delegations met in Moscow to negotiate their first treaty on relations between the two countries. ( 175) The resulting agreement served to confirm the sovereignty of the GDR, which had been recognized by the Soviet Union in the March 1954 declaration, and to eliminate any appearance of a special relationship between Moscow and Bonn. Although it appeared to strengthen the GDR's position within the socialist bloc, it was more accurately a minimum stop necessary to proclaim the Soviet commitment to their ally. Negotiations had not been entered into until after the ratification of the Paris Treaty and after the Moscow-Bonn agreement. Furthermore, a treaty was imperative to formalize relations between the the USSR and the GDR on a level commensurate with relations between the Soviet Union and West Germany. These two treaties marked acceptance by Soviet policy of two German states.


CONCLUSIONS

The East German uprising forced a change in Kremlin policy to economic support and consolidation of the Ulbrtcht government. The Soviets needed to strengthen the GDR and, thereby, their own position in order to maintain their policy options in Germany. The circumstances for reunification had changed. The Kremlin could not advantageously enter into negotiations for the reunification of Germany from such as weakened position. Nor would the GDR be a useful member of the East bloc unless conditions improved significantly. Under prevailing conditions, East Germany would become an economic drain and/or a political fuse threatening the security and stability of East Europe. Renewed support for the Ulbricht faction of the SED appeared to be the major inconsistency in the political and

-180-

Notes for this page

Add a new note
If you are trying to select text to create highlights or citations, remember that you must now click or tap on the first word, and then click or tap on the last word.
One moment ...
Default project is now your active project.
Project items

Items saved from this book

This book has been saved
Highlights (0)
Some of your highlights are legacy items.

Highlights saved before July 30, 2012 will not be displayed on their respective source pages.

You can easily re-create the highlights by opening the book page or article, selecting the text, and clicking “Highlight.”

Citations (0)
Some of your citations are legacy items.

Any citation created before July 30, 2012 will labeled as a “Cited page.” New citations will be saved as cited passages, pages or articles.

We also added the ability to view new citations from your projects or the book or article where you created them.

Notes (0)
Bookmarks (0)

You have no saved items from this book

Project items include:
  • Saved book/article
  • Highlights
  • Quotes/citations
  • Notes
  • Bookmarks
Notes
Cite this page

Cited page

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Buy instant access to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

(Einhorn, 1992, p. 25)

(Einhorn 25)

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Cited page

Bookmark this page
Soviet Policy toward East Germany Reconsidered: The Postwar Decade
Table of contents

Table of contents

  • Title Page iii
  • Contents vii
  • Tables ix
  • Abbreviations xi
  • 1 - Introduction 3
  • Notes 10
  • 2 - Germany, 1945-1949 13
  • Conclusions 43
  • Notes 46
  • 3 - The Question of Exploitation 65
  • Conclusions 99
  • Notes 102
  • 4 - Building to a Crisis 115
  • Conclusions 135
  • Notes 137
  • 5 - Transition to Support 149
  • Conclusions 180
  • Notes 182
  • 6 - The Gdr: A Special Case in East Europe 197
  • Conclusions 209
  • Notes 211
  • 7 - Conclusions 215
  • Appendix a Protocol of Proceedings of the Crimea Conference 223
  • Appendix B Protocol of Proceedings of the Potsdam Conference 225
  • Appendix C Reparations 227
  • Appendix D Summation of Soviet Credits to the Gdr, 1945-1960 231
  • Selected Bibliography 233
  • Index 257
  • About the Author 263
Settings

Settings

Typeface
Text size Smaller Larger Reset View mode
Search within

Search within this book

Look up

Look up a word

  • Dictionary
  • Thesaurus
Please submit a word or phrase above.
Print this page

Print this page

Why can't I print more than one page at a time?

Help
Full screen
/ 270

matching results for page

    Questia reader help

    How to highlight and cite specific passages

    1. Click or tap the first word you want to select.
    2. Click or tap the last word you want to select, and you’ll see everything in between get selected.
    3. You’ll then get a menu of options like creating a highlight or a citation from that passage of text.

    OK, got it!

    Cited passage

    Style
    Citations are available only to our active members.
    Buy instant access to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn, 1992, p. 25).

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn 25)

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences."1

    1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

    Cited passage

    Thanks for trying Questia!

    Please continue trying out our research tools, but please note, full functionality is available only to our active members.

    Your work will be lost once you leave this Web page.

    Buy instant access to save your work.

    Already a member? Log in now.

    Oops!

    An unknown error has occurred. Please click the button below to reload the page. If the problem persists, please try again in a little while.