Soviet Policy toward East Germany Reconsidered: The Postwar Decade

By Ann L. Phillips | Go to book overview

7
Conclusions

The study of Soviet policy toward the GDR has shown a policy of complexity and ambivalence evolving as Allied relations in Germany and throughout the world changed. Soviet policy was developed to meet the intertwining national security and economic needs of the USSR first and foremost, within the constraints imposed by deteriorating relations with the United States on a considerably weaker Soviet Union. The international environment, the German situation, and Soviet policy toward East Germany interacted dynamically to provide both opportunities for and restraints on the Kremlin.

Any attempt to divine the true intentions of Soviet policy toward Germany must begin with the interdependent goals of the Soviet Union in the postwar period: enhancement of national security and reconstruction of a devastated economy. Stalin went to considerable lengths to conceal the extent of ruin from his Western Allies. The Soviet Union was in no positon to confront the West in a military contest but camouflaged weakness with aggressive posturing. Soviet reparations policy, the rejection of Marshall aid, and the Berlin blockade were all expressions of weakness. With regard to the division of Germany, as has been shown, Soviet policy was generally one of reaction to the progressive steps by the West to integrate West Germany into their alliance. The Soviets had no reason to expect Western aid or cooperation in reaching their goals, given their wartime experiences, particularly the delay of the Second Front, and the duplicitous behavior perceived in the American position toward the USSR between Yalta and Potsdam. The historical basis for mutual fear and distrust was not overcome by war-

-215-

Notes for this page

Add a new note
If you are trying to select text to create highlights or citations, remember that you must now click or tap on the first word, and then click or tap on the last word.
One moment ...
Default project is now your active project.
Project items

Items saved from this book

This book has been saved
Highlights (0)
Some of your highlights are legacy items.

Highlights saved before July 30, 2012 will not be displayed on their respective source pages.

You can easily re-create the highlights by opening the book page or article, selecting the text, and clicking “Highlight.”

Citations (0)
Some of your citations are legacy items.

Any citation created before July 30, 2012 will labeled as a “Cited page.” New citations will be saved as cited passages, pages or articles.

We also added the ability to view new citations from your projects or the book or article where you created them.

Notes (0)
Bookmarks (0)

You have no saved items from this book

Project items include:
  • Saved book/article
  • Highlights
  • Quotes/citations
  • Notes
  • Bookmarks
Notes
Cite this page

Cited page

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Buy instant access to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

(Einhorn, 1992, p. 25)

(Einhorn 25)

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Cited page

Bookmark this page
Soviet Policy toward East Germany Reconsidered: The Postwar Decade
Table of contents

Table of contents

  • Title Page iii
  • Contents vii
  • Tables ix
  • Abbreviations xi
  • 1 - Introduction 3
  • Notes 10
  • 2 - Germany, 1945-1949 13
  • Conclusions 43
  • Notes 46
  • 3 - The Question of Exploitation 65
  • Conclusions 99
  • Notes 102
  • 4 - Building to a Crisis 115
  • Conclusions 135
  • Notes 137
  • 5 - Transition to Support 149
  • Conclusions 180
  • Notes 182
  • 6 - The Gdr: A Special Case in East Europe 197
  • Conclusions 209
  • Notes 211
  • 7 - Conclusions 215
  • Appendix a Protocol of Proceedings of the Crimea Conference 223
  • Appendix B Protocol of Proceedings of the Potsdam Conference 225
  • Appendix C Reparations 227
  • Appendix D Summation of Soviet Credits to the Gdr, 1945-1960 231
  • Selected Bibliography 233
  • Index 257
  • About the Author 263
Settings

Settings

Typeface
Text size Smaller Larger Reset View mode
Search within

Search within this book

Look up

Look up a word

  • Dictionary
  • Thesaurus
Please submit a word or phrase above.
Print this page

Print this page

Why can't I print more than one page at a time?

Help
Full screen
/ 270

matching results for page

    Questia reader help

    How to highlight and cite specific passages

    1. Click or tap the first word you want to select.
    2. Click or tap the last word you want to select, and you’ll see everything in between get selected.
    3. You’ll then get a menu of options like creating a highlight or a citation from that passage of text.

    OK, got it!

    Cited passage

    Style
    Citations are available only to our active members.
    Buy instant access to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn, 1992, p. 25).

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn 25)

    "Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences."1

    1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

    Cited passage

    Thanks for trying Questia!

    Please continue trying out our research tools, but please note, full functionality is available only to our active members.

    Your work will be lost once you leave this Web page.

    Buy instant access to save your work.

    Already a member? Log in now.

    Author Advanced search

    Oops!

    An unknown error has occurred. Please click the button below to reload the page. If the problem persists, please try again in a little while.