THE DIALECTIC OF CONSTITUTIONS
THIS closing section is to deal with matters of substance and enactment as they apply to Constitutions (another of our Stance words; from con and statuere, to place, set -- which is in turn related to stare, stand). It will revolve about the subject of Constitutional principles (or ideals, or wishes). It will consider the bearing of these principles, or wishes, upon judicial tactics in the reviewing of legislative enactments. It will trace the relation between Constitutional principles and the patterns of litigation. And it will show how the grammar of Constitutional wishes relates to the rhetoric of political manifestoes and promises (such as we get in election platforms or a declaration of war aims).
A book On Human Relations being, by the nature of its subject, to a large extent "idealistic" (since such a book should feature the relationships typical of agents), it is obvious that our analytic instruments must be shaped in conformity with representative idealist anecdotes. Otherwise the analysis can but lead to misrepresentation. And such a work, in aiming above all at a set of sub-terms generally classifiable under the heading of the generic term, agent, should be "idealistic," at least in the sense that it should contribute to the critique of idealism. And a Constitution would be an "idealistic anecdote" in that its structure is an enactment of human wills.
Originally, I had intended to begin this work with my material on "The Constitutional Wish", designed as introduction to my material on rhetorical strategies and symbolic acts. It was to offer a kind of preparatory groundwork, something "substantial" as a solid point of departure -- for what could be more basic, more "laid down," than the law? However, I began to realize that this introduction needed in turn a pre-introduction, to explain exactly why I thought I should begin a study of human relations with a study of constitutional relations. And out of this grew a long "Introduction -- Concerning Introduc-