genuinely conceivable, his existence very well can be. Hence, the impossibility of significantly denying 'Greatness exists' appears not to be nullified by any comparable difficulty in asserting it. And of course many mystics claim to experience God. Since their claim is compatible with the conception of God, and the claim of falsification is not thus compatible, Anselm's Principle seems to be vindicated. Greatness is conceivable only as existent, by the very criteria which allow us to conceive either the existence or the nonexistence of any island, dollar, devil, you please.
The basic pattern of attacks upon the Argument is this: however exceptional God may be, He cannot be an exception to the ultimate rules of language or of meaning. But this is also the pattern of many positivistic attacks, not simply on the Argument, but on the idea of God itself. Thus God could not be infallible, for to perceive or know is to experience things in a perspective which is bound to put some things in clearer light than others: He could not be both perfect and 'living', for to live is to have an environment whose features set limits to the actions of living organisms. In short, God cannot be a sheer exception to the rules governing the meaning of the terms applied to Him. Just so, the anti- Anselmian is sure that God could not be an exception to the rule governing 'exist'--that it is always an arbitrary or contingent determination of the disjunction: to exist or not to exist. So sure is he of this that he does not even need to read and rarely does read--or at least remember--even the four pages of Prosl. II-IV in order to know how wrong they must be. And what is the critic so sure of? Unwittingly or wittingly,