questions and have nothing to do with particular perceptual facts, to the lack of which Gaunilo refers. If God's very existence were relative to particular perceptual facts, then He would not be God but an idol. The problem is one of meaning: is worship self-consistent, or is it either contradictory or too indefinite an attitude even to contradict itself?
Considering the reception which Gaunilo has had to this very day, one is moved to ask: has ever a commentator upon a philosopher so long and so much misled so many?
The reception of the Argument in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries was almost as odd as what happened in its inventor's own lifetime, or in the modern period. (In this section I am heavily indebted--and deeply grateful--to P. A. Daniels. See Bibliography I.) In the twelfth century the Proof was simply ignored, so far as our records go. Three conclusions have been drawn from this: all accepted the Proof, all rejected it, they were unacquainted with it. Daniels shows that the last is the most reasonable. In the next three centuries things were dramatically different. Fifteen authors refer to the Proof, of whom the following ten accept it: William of Auxerre, Richard Fischacre, Alexander of Hales, Bonaventura, Matthew of Aquasparta, Johannes Peckham, Nicolaus of Cusa, Aegidius of Rome, William of Ware, and Duns Scotus. Of these at least four, Alexander, Bonaventura, Nicolaus, and Scotus seem to have some appreciation of Prosl. III and of the true Anselmian Principle; the rest seem to be thinking largely or exclusively of Prosl. II. Albertus Magnus, Peter of Tarentaise, and Henry