that it was not to be evaded.27 However, our present situation is that we have an alternative form of theism which also, and with better right, can employ the ontological argument. So I incline to the view that the next move is up to the skeptics.
Hume makes a remarkable concession concerning the possible importance of the ontological argument: he grants that its validity would dispose of the argument against theism based on the evils in the world. And of course, no empirical facts can testify against a logical necessity. Indeed, the argument from evil itself rests on the supposed analytic truth that Greatness must result in a world without evil. This, in turn, means that Greatness in God implies an absolute absence of independence or initiative of action in the creatures. For, if they have any such independence, evil may be their doing, for all we could know, not God's. ('They' here means creatures generally, not just human beings!) And to say that God should, and as Great logically would, grant no freedom in this sense is to say that a being who can and must deny all genuine independence of action to others is better than one who could and would foster suitable degrees of independence in them. So far from finding this analytically true, some of us find it analytically false. Perhaps 'omnipotence', in the sense of a monopoly of power, an infinitely stingy denial of real power to others, is even a mere absurdity. In any case, it____________________