not of mere detail, but of methodological principle. The central philosophical question, that is, the rationally accessible content, if any, of the central religious question, is not an empirical matter, and empiricism, persisted in to the end, merely makes the muddling of this question the guaranteed outcome of all our philosophical efforts.
Will the great Kant cure the muddle, where the brilliantly lucid Hume could not? Or will he complicate and compound it by adding an alleged class of problems which are neither empirical nor a priori, and concern neither the intelligibly necessary nor the intelligibly contingent, but "something we know not what," the noumenon? Will he return to the Anselmian problem on at least the level of profundity to which Anselm penetrated, or will he deal with it only in the loose pseudo-Anselmian form current in modern rationalism? The reader perhaps foresees the answers.
Apparently Kant knew nothing of the Proslogium. Even the Cartesian argument he probably thought of chiefly in the forms given to it by Leibniz and, above all, Baumgarten. These forms were, at best, no improvement upon the Anselmian original. Moreover, they employed definitions of God which were less rich in possibilities than Anselm's own, being more hopelessly committed to 'platonism'. And indeed Kant, after more than seven centuries, was no freer than Anselm had been to investigate the possibility that the Greek way of construing the idea of God as an absolute and immutable maximum of reality or perfection might be a mistranslation of the religious idea, and that a better translation might