stract and the concrete, or--as one may also say--the logically weak and the logically strong. From the former there cannot be a deductive bridge to the latter. This is not modern, it is timeless good sense. But the question remains: is 'somehow actualized' any less abstract than 'perhaps unactualized'? On the assumption that there is a conceivable status of 'unactualized Greatness' and another conceivable status of 'actualized Greatness', then the assertion of the latter must be less abstract, and logically stronger. But this double conceivability in relation to actualization is just what Anselm and Findlay-- wiser than he knows--deny. Naturally, one must admit the double conceivability in ordinary contingent cases; the contrast of God with these conceivably nonexistent natures not only harmonizes with their admission but requires it. The admission of ordinary things as conceivably nonexistent (and therefore not divine) is the same point, put from the other end.
Beyond the abstract-concrete paradox, overcome in neoclassical doctrine, what is left of Findlay's 'atheistic' argument (really 'positivistic', in the categorical or dogmatic sense, as I have been using terms)? Does not what was well designed as an attack on traditional theism become a valuable instrument of defence for a less conventional form of religious thought?
Apparently inspired partly or chiefly by Barth's fine work, an exciting and imaginative essay on Anselm's argument has recently appeared. It is not wholly clear what its author would do with the Findlay paradox, yet there is some evidence that he may be aware of it. (The promised sequel to the essay should clarify the question.) This article is another of the