thing would be contradictory; furthermore, to assert that a property is not instantiated is to imply that its noninstantiation is conceivable, and hence that any possible instance of it would be something existing contingently. Will Berg say that there is no reason to regard necessary existence as superior? But anyone who holds that is so remote from Anselm's point of view that he might do better than try to construe his text.
Nevertheless it is good that the attempt has been made to express Anselm in nonmodal yet formal terms and that a way has been found to construct in these terms a valid Anselmian argument, valid save (no trifling qualification) for the blindness of its initial premise.
One of the many recent attempts to improve upon traditional criticisms of the Argument discards the contention that the Argument is invalid simply because existence is not a predicate. We can, if we wish, make it a predicate in a certain case by definition. But then, it is urged, there still remains the question, does anything correspond to the definition?
Until further arguments are offered, it seems reasonable to hold that there is nothing logically improper in so defining the expression, 'God', that 'God exists' is a tautology and 'God does not exist' selfcontradictory. In fact it seems to me that the definition I have given expresses a concept of God (i.e., as necessarily existing) which many people actually accept (just as it is a common conception of Satan that he merely happens to exist). I wish . . . to show that this concept of God can give no support to the religious. I shall argue that no matter what its content, this concept of God is still simply a concept. What must be shown, and what cannot be shown just by an analysis of the concept, is that there actually exists something which answers to the concept. Even if