either asserting positivism, or else failing to understand the religious idea; while in admitting it he is refuting his own argumentation.
The absurdity of the reasoning appears especially clearly if we consider such cases of "defining things to exist' as the following, 'existing dodos', 'existing dragons', and the like. Here there is no serious paradox. A dodo or dragon would exist, if at all, contingently, and hence there cannot be any logical impossibility in the nonexistence of dodos or dragons. To use a definition to make it appear otherwise is so flagrant a misuse of the defining process as to need no special further analysis. It is just the question at issue whether the religious idea is or is not the idea of a thing which would or could exist contingently. Anselm showed that it is not. Most of this author's discussion is a series of red herrings distracting his and his reader's attention from this central issue. His most relevant remarks are attempts to prove that all existence must, objectively regarded, be contingent. But on that assumption what Anselm showed must have been, as Findlay rightly points out, the impossibility, not the necessity, of the divine reality.
I conclude that the remarkable ingenuity of this author does not save him from missing--or not clearly seeing--the modal structure of the Anselmian discovery.
Our last two examples are distinguished formal logicians.
I sometimes think that Heinrich Scholz was the noblest human being that I have ever known (I met him in 1949), a theologian who turned from theological studies to formal logic because--and this is characteristic of the man--he thought