mutability, rather than people's estimates of the chances of a negative outcome that determine the actions they take. We hope that the steps taken here, as preliminary and tentative as they are, have made it at least a little easier to imagine the counterfactual world in which counterfactual thinking is well understood.
The research reported in this chapter was supported by a grant to Dale Miller from the National Institute of Mental Health and a doctoral fellowship to Brian Taylor from the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada. Portions of this chapter were presented at the annual meeting of the Society for Experimental Social Psychology, Columbus, Ohio, October 1991. We thank James Olson, Deborah Prentice, Neal Roese, and Jacquie Vorauer for their helpful critiques of an earlier version of this chapter.
Correspondence concerning the contents of this chapter should be addressed to Dale T. Miller, Department of Psychology, Green Hall, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544-1010.
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