Modeling Rationality, Morality, and Evolution

By Peter A. Danielson | Go to book overview
ity is that of sequential equilibrium from Kreps and Wilson ( 1982b). A sequential equilibrium is an equilibrium in strategies (i.e., mutual best response) and also in beliefs. Beliefs about unknown types must be consistent. See Kreps and Wilson ( 1982b) for more details.
38
See Reny ( 1992) for more on this topic.
39
Strategic complexity issues have also been considered in the infinitely repeated game. Rubinstein ( 1986) and Abreu and Rubinstein ( 1988) consider infinitely repeated games played with finite automata. Instead of arbitrarily restricting the number of states, these papers assume a cost of complexity. The cost is introduced lexigraphically in that given two strategies with the same sum of discounted stage payoffs, the agent prefers the least complex. The authors demonstrate that the relatively mild complexity assumptions can dramatically reduce the number of equilibria in infinitely repeated games.
40
See Cooper et al. ( 1996) for a recent study. Frank, Gilovich, and Regan ( 1993) provide an interesting study of the effect of studying economics on the tendency to co-operate.
41
See Selten and Stoecker ( 1986). Their experiments not only repeat the PD, but also repeat the entire game. They find that defection tends to appear sooner in latter trials. See also Cooper et al. ( 1996).
42
See Feinberg and Husted ( 1993) who alter the discount rate by changing the probability that the repeated game is terminated.

References

Abreu, D. ( 1988). "On the theory of infinitely repeated games with discounting". Econometrica, 56: 383-96.

Abreu, D., and A. Rubinstein ( 1988). "The structure of nash equilibrium in repeated games with finite automata". Econometrica, 56: 1259-81.

Abreu, D., D. Pearce, and E. Stacchetti ( 1990). "Toward a theory of discounted repeated games with imperfect monitoring". Econometrica, 58: 1041-63.

----- ( 1993). "Renegotiation and symmetry in repeated games". Journal of Economic Theory, 60: 217-40.

Andreoni, J., and J. H. Miller ( 1993). "Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma: experimental evidence". The Economic journal, 103: 570-85.

Arend, R. J. ( 1995). Essays in Policy Analysis and Strategy, PhD dissertation, University of British Columbia

Aumann, R. J. ( 1974). "Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies". Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1: 67-96.

----- ( 1987). Game theory. In J. Eatwell, M. Milgate and P Newman (eds.), The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, Vol. 12 ( London: Macmillan Press). pp. 460-82.

Axelrod, R. M. ( 1984). The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books.

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Modeling Rationality, Morality, and Evolution
Table of contents

Table of contents

  • Series Editors ii
  • Title Page iii
  • Acknowledgments v
  • Contents vii
  • Contributors ix
  • 1: Introduction 3
  • References 9
  • Rationality 11
  • 2: Rationality and Rules 13
  • Notes 34
  • 3: Intention and Deliberation 41
  • References 54
  • 4: Following Through with One's Plans: Reply to David Gauthier 55
  • Notes 64
  • Notes 65
  • 5: How Braess' Paradox Solves Newcomb's Problem 67
  • Notes 86
  • 6: Economics of the Prisoner's Dilemma: A Background 92
  • Notes 111
  • Notes 115
  • 7: Modeling Rationality: A Normative or Descriptive Task? 119
  • References 132
  • Modeling Social Interaction 135
  • 8: Theorem 1 137
  • References 158
  • 9: The Failure of Success: Intrafamilial Exploitation in the Prisoner's Dilemma 161
  • References 184
  • 10: Transforming Social Dilemmas: Group Identity and Co-Operation 185
  • Conclusion 206
  • Acknowledgments 207
  • Notes 207
  • Notes 208
  • 11: Beliefs and Co-Operation 210
  • References 234
  • 12: The Neural Representation of the Social World 236
  • References 253
  • Morality 255
  • 13: Moral Dualism 257
  • Notes 278
  • Notes 281
  • 14: Categorically Rational Preferences and the Structure of Morality 282
  • Notes 301
  • References 301
  • 15: Why We Need a Moral Equilibrium Theory 302
  • Notes 330
  • Notes 338
  • 16: Morality's Last Chance 340
  • Notes 371
  • Notes 374
  • Evolution 377
  • 17: Mutual Aid: Darwin Meets the Logic of Decision 379
  • Notes 403
  • Notes 404
  • 18: Three Differences Between Deliberation and Evolution 408
  • Notes 420
  • Notes 421
  • 19: Evolutionary Models of Co-Operative Mechanisms: Artificial Morality and Genetic Programming 423
  • Acknowledgments 439
  • Notes 439
  • Notes 441
  • 20: Norms as Emergent Properties of Adaptive Learning: The Case of Economic Routines 442
  • Notes 459
  • Notes 461
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