Modeling Rationality, Morality, and Evolution

By Peter A. Danielson | Go to book overview

lutionary learning can only complement more inductive inquiries from, for example, social psychology and organizational sciences.


Acknowledgments

Support for the research at different stages has been provided by the International Institute of Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), Laxenburg, Austria; the Italian Ministry of University and Research (Murst 40%); the Italian Research Council ( CNR, Progetto Strategico "Cambiamento Tecnologico e Sviluppo Economico"); and the Center for Research in Management, University of California, Berkeley.


Notes
1
Clearly, this very general definition of rules includes as particular cases also the procedures for decision and action postulated by "rational" theories.
2
These finer categorizations are quite familiar in political sciences: see for example, the discussion in Koford and Miller ( 1991). On the contrary, the broader notion of norms adopted here includes both moral constraints and positive behavioural prescriptions (i.e., both "morality" and "ethicality" in the sense of Hegel).
3
Cf., for instance, Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky ( 1982), Kahneman and Tversky ( 1979), Herrnstein and Prelec ( 1991).
4
On the evolution of representations, see also Margolis ( 1987). In economics, such a co-evolutionary perspective is held by a growing minority of practitioners. More on it can be found in Nelson and Winter ( 1982), Dosi et al. ( 1988), March ( 1988), Marengo ( 1992), Dosi and Marengo ( 1994), Arthur ( 1992).
5
This is, of course, in line with the findings of Axelrod ( 1984) and Miller ( 1988).
6
See for discussions, among others, Elster ( 1986), Luhmann ( 1979), and with respect to economics, also Dosi and Metcalfe ( 1991).
7
The central reference on the distinction between "substantive" and "procedural" rationality is, of course, Herbert Simon: see especially Simon ( 1976), ( 1981), ( 1986).
8
See Lewis ( 1985a) and Rustem and Velupillai ( 1990). Note that, loosely speaking, algorithmic solvability means that one is able to define a recursive procedure that will get you, say, to a Nash equilibrium. This turns out to be a question quite independent from proving a theorem which shows the existence of such an equilibrium.
9
Given a preference relation > on a set of objects X and a non-empty set A belonging to X, the set of acceptable alternatives is defined as: c(A,>) = {x ∈ A: there is no y ∈ A such that y > x}.
10
Broadly speaking, we call a set decidable if there exist an algorithm which is always able to completely identify its elements, i.e., if the membership function which characterizes the set is computable.

-459-

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Modeling Rationality, Morality, and Evolution
Table of contents

Table of contents

  • Series Editors ii
  • Title Page iii
  • Acknowledgments v
  • Contents vii
  • Contributors ix
  • 1: Introduction 3
  • References 9
  • Rationality 11
  • 2: Rationality and Rules 13
  • Notes 34
  • 3: Intention and Deliberation 41
  • References 54
  • 4: Following Through with One's Plans: Reply to David Gauthier 55
  • Notes 64
  • Notes 65
  • 5: How Braess' Paradox Solves Newcomb's Problem 67
  • Notes 86
  • 6: Economics of the Prisoner's Dilemma: A Background 92
  • Notes 111
  • Notes 115
  • 7: Modeling Rationality: A Normative or Descriptive Task? 119
  • References 132
  • Modeling Social Interaction 135
  • 8: Theorem 1 137
  • References 158
  • 9: The Failure of Success: Intrafamilial Exploitation in the Prisoner's Dilemma 161
  • References 184
  • 10: Transforming Social Dilemmas: Group Identity and Co-Operation 185
  • Conclusion 206
  • Acknowledgments 207
  • Notes 207
  • Notes 208
  • 11: Beliefs and Co-Operation 210
  • References 234
  • 12: The Neural Representation of the Social World 236
  • References 253
  • Morality 255
  • 13: Moral Dualism 257
  • Notes 278
  • Notes 281
  • 14: Categorically Rational Preferences and the Structure of Morality 282
  • Notes 301
  • References 301
  • 15: Why We Need a Moral Equilibrium Theory 302
  • Notes 330
  • Notes 338
  • 16: Morality's Last Chance 340
  • Notes 371
  • Notes 374
  • Evolution 377
  • 17: Mutual Aid: Darwin Meets the Logic of Decision 379
  • Notes 403
  • Notes 404
  • 18: Three Differences Between Deliberation and Evolution 408
  • Notes 420
  • Notes 421
  • 19: Evolutionary Models of Co-Operative Mechanisms: Artificial Morality and Genetic Programming 423
  • Acknowledgments 439
  • Notes 439
  • Notes 441
  • 20: Norms as Emergent Properties of Adaptive Learning: The Case of Economic Routines 442
  • Notes 459
  • Notes 461
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