The Self-Regulation of Human Behavior by Means of the Epistemic Correlates of Ideas
To appreciate the importance of the article by Rosenblueth, Wiener and Bigelow entitled "Behavior, Purpose and Teleology"1 one must recall two major reasons why many modern natural scientists, psychologists, philosophers and politicians came to the conclusion that ideas are "mere epiphenomena" incapable of having any significance for the motor behavior of human beings and hence irrelevant to what they actually do in their political decisions and behavior.
The first reason is that the earlier scientists and philosophers, such as Hobbes, Locke, Descartes, Haeckel and Marx, who broke from the naïve realistic concepts of Aristotle and St. Thomas, interpreted the imageless concept by postulation masses of Newton's physics as little imageful concept by intuition billiard balls which they supposed they directly sensed in the aggregate if not individually. Thus the notion, of the modern man of "common sense," arose of directly sensed material substances obeying the mechanically causal rules of Newton's physics.
Upon these unconscious, colorless and hence unaesthetic material substances, conscious minds, conceived as mental substances or windowless spiritual monads with their ideas and normative purposes, could have no influence. Otherwise the principle of the conservation of mass and energy would be violated. Moreover, the mathematical