situation. That SAP would exercise such an influence on the economy can hardly be viewed as surprising. Rather, the economics of structural adjustment were the logical outgrowth of the Western-orientated, capitalist structures and the patterns that made the European Economic Community the nation's dominant trading partner during the first nyayo decade, as well as in the preceding period of independent Kenya's history. Moreover, the severe economic problems that manifested themselves during the nyayo era forced government planners towards SAP. It also reflected the continued dependent nature of Kenya's economy; dependent on Western European, American and Japanese markets, development assistance and development models, Kenya would adopt SAP with less resistance than, for example, Tanzania or Zambia.
Yet perhaps the most significant characteristic of Kenya's economy during the initial nyayo decade was the fact that it was able to confront the economic crises of the period far more effectively than most African states. The continued growth of tourist receipts and the resiliency demonstrated by Kenya's small-farm sector, which had responded so remarkably to the opportunities of the Kenyatta era, in rebounding from the droughts and the negative international market conditions provide graphic examples of the underlying strengths. These, far more than SAP, allowed Kenya to survive the economic difficulties of the period without large-scale economic collapse and the resultant political turmoil that it would have produced.