a. Intrarepublic conflict : Examples of this type included Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh and Nakhichevan; Uzbekistan and Tajikistan over the Tajik-dominated cities of Samarghand and Bukhara; Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan over the Aral Sea. By virtue of its peace initiatives in the Caucasus conflict, Iran was potentially readied to intervene in these other actual or potential conflicts to either mediate or pre-empt their eruption.
b. Interrepublic conflicts : Here, we must distinguish between and among ethnic, local, and religious-political conflicts which often overlap with each other -- which makes their subcategorization somewhat suspect. Yet such subcategorizations may be very valid when we look at, say, inter-Turkic conflicts and or potential conflicts between Uzbeks and Kyrgizis, and or between Tajiks and Uzbeks in Uzbekistan (i.e., ethnic conflicts), or the conflict between Islamic fundamentalists and secularists (i.e., religio-political conflicts), or such conflicts as between "Bukharaian" and non-Bukharaian conflicts (i.e., locational conflicts), and so on. Hypothetically speaking, Iran could intervene in cases of ethnic conflict, especially between the Farsispeaking and non-Farsi populations, as either a neutral mediator or a partisan patron and ally of one of the conflicting parties. The possibility of power-broker role for Iran in such interrepublic conflicts depended on the level of prior commitment of Iran to that situation, and on the magnitude of confidence-building and trust with these parties generated by Iran's prior conflictmanagement role, not to overlook Iran's ability to cooperate with Russia in such areas. 83 Anticipation of a greater role for Iran in this connection may not be a futile exercise, for it could help prepare the country's peace-makers for a broader and more active role in establishing peace and harmony in what the Iranian press often refer to as the "Iran plateau."