Golimar) where the majority of both the Shias and Sunnis belong to the working class, poorer sector of society.
Three groups have been most active in sectarian violence in Pakistan in recent years: the bazaar merchants, the madrassah students, and the semi-educated, unemployed youth of the urban centers of Punjab. The bazaaris, whose Islamic religiosity is integrally linked with their commitment to sectarian-based rituals, provide the financial wherewithal to sustain sectarian movements, protests, and leaders. Madrassah students provide the manpower (or "muscle power") and act as a vanguard in sectarian clashes. The unemployed youth of Pakistan's urban centers, who constitute roughly a quarter of Pakistan's labor force, also become an easy prey to religious demagogues and are readily available on hire as agents of violence."
A few general observations are in order to conclude this chapter: "Islamization" measures introduced in Pakistan during the Zia regime became associated with the increasing sectarian tensions because of their emphasis on Shariah andfiqhi (juristic) hair-splitting, rather than on maqasid-i-Shariah (objective of Shariah). This legalistic approach to "Islamization" naturally raised the question as to which interpretation of the Islamic law is more Islamically authentic and should, therefore, be incorporated in public policy. Islamic revival has thus created dissensions among various Islamic sects more than it has unified different social strata of Pakistan society. A different set of Islamic agenda, signifying freedom and tolerance and concern for Islamic principles of social equality and economic justice, would have certainly received much more enthusiastic popular response and would have enhanced social harmony and national integration.