AS RAPIDLY AS it emerged in the late 1960s, the newly instituted cooperation between Japan and the ROK soon faded. As relations developed during the 1970s, tensions surfaced over a reexamination of the defense links established in 1969. This was coupled with the emergence of deep differences over how to deal with North Korea. In addition, intense friction b ROKe out over domestic political issues in both countries, driving relations to the brink of rupture. Interlaced with these numerous disputes, a resurgence of historical emotional tensions further strained already brittle ties.
How this abrupt downturn in the character of relations came about is the subject of this chapter. An underlying cause for the growth of friction in the years from 1972 to 1974 was, ironically, the lessening of cold-war tensions. In the language of the quasi-alliance model, regional and superpower detente brought change to the structure of abandonment and entrapment concerns at both the multilateral and bilateral levels of the relationship. 1 At the former level Japanese concerns about U.S. abandonment became less salient relative to the 1969-71 period, while ROK fears of U.S. abandonment remained unaltered by the tensionreducing effects of detente. This fundamental disparity affected Japanese and Korean attitudes toward one another.
In Seoul an increase in abandonment fears emerged with regard to Japan's relations with Communist neighbors. To alleviate these fears, the ROK pushed for tighter quasi-allied ties with Japan against the North. Meanwhile, Tokyo experienced heightened entrapment fears with regard to excessive ties with the ROK, as the Japanese felt threatened by different contingencies. Renewed conflict in Korea was not only a function of North Korean actions but also a potential outgrowth of