rity consciousness develops because of education than because of some catastrophic attack.
As it seems futile and self-defeating to attempt to stop either the flow of relatively open networks into U.S. systems or the international flow of IT that might make IW attacks against U.S. targets likely, the United States will need to go with those flows. At the same time, though, the United States will need to harden its systems and drive the development of international legal regimes so that they can cope with technological evolution. When discussing cyberspace it is easy to fall into the habit of calling things "new," "unique," or "revolutionary," (mostly because they often are) and assuming that old rules do not apply. Certainly IT can be "new," "unique," or "revolutionary," but in dealing with the new, unique, and revolutionary security threats that arise in a networked world, it is important to recognize that there is no singular solution to U.S. vulnerabilities. Just as the atom bomb gave the U.S. tremendous power, but then also posed a grave threat, the U.S. will have to adjust to the dangers that its technological talents bring it. In cyberspace, as in the old, physical world, there are no substitutes for vigilance, vigor, and ingenuity.