general. Attention to women's experiences, so long absent from political theory,
must provide us with ways of understanding and conceptualizing the individual-in-relationship that will allow us to speak more effectively about the simultaneity of human autonomy and interdependence, of freedom and commitment
in social and political life.
I wish to acknowledge the help of Nancy ("Ann") Davis, Robert Goodin, Amy Gutmann, Mona Harrington, Virginia Held, Will Kymlicka, Martha Minow, Susan Okin, Kate Tyler,
members of the 1990 Mellon Faculty Center at Vassar College, and members of the 1991- 1992 Program in Ethics and Public Affairs at Princeton University. The final version of this
paper was written while I was a Fellow at the University Center for Human Values at Princeton University, for whose support I am grateful.
This chapter is revised from Mary L. Shanley, "'Surrogate Mothering' and Women's Freedom: A Critique of Contracts for Human Reproduction", Signs 18( 3):618-639 ( 1993). Reprinted with permission from the publisher, the University of Chicago Press.
See, e.g., Lori Andrews, Between Strangers: Surrogate Mothers, Expectant Fathers, &
Brave New Babies ( New York: Harper & Row, 1989); Avi Katz, "Surrogate Motherhood and
the Baby-Selling Laws", Columbia Journal of Law and Social Problems 20( 1):1-52 ( 1986); Carmel Shalev, Birth Power ( New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989); Marjorie Maguire Shultz
, "Reproductive Technology and Intention-based Parenthood: An Opportunity for
Gender Neutrality", Wisconsin Law Review 1990( 2):297-398 ( 1990).
John Lawrence Hill, "The Case for Enforcement of the Surrogate Contract", politics
and the Life Sciences 8( 2):157-159 ( 1990); John Robertson, "Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy and Childbirth", Virginia Law Review 69:405-462 ( 1983); John Robertson, "Embryos, Families and Procreative Liberty: The Legal Structures of the
New Reproduction", Southern California Law Review 59:942-1041 ( 1986); and
See, e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, "Re-Expressing Parenthood", Yale Law Journal 98
( 2):293-340 ( 1988); Carole Pateman, The Sexual Contract ( Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1988), 209-218; Barbara Katz Rothman, Recreating Motherhood: Ideology and Technology in Patriarchal Society ( New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1989); Susan M. Okin, "A Critique of Pregnancy Contracts", Politics and the Life Sciences 8( 2):205-210 ( 1990); and Martha A. Field
, Surrogate Motherhood: The Legal and Human Issues ( Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988) and "The Case Against Enforcement of Surrogacy Contracts", Politics and the Life Sciences 8( 2):199-204 ( 1990).
Defenses of the practice of contract pregnancy that focus on the "right to procreate"
sometimes ignore the ethical issues related to the woman who bears the child. Robertson 1983 and 1986 render the pregnant woman all but invisible. Maura A. Ryan critiques Robertson work in "The Argument for Unlimited Procreative Liberty: A Feminist Critique", Hastings Center Report 20( 4):4-12 ( 1990).
See, e.g., Hoyt v. Florida 368 U.S. 57 ( 1961), which held that Florida's automatic exemption of women from jury duty because they might have dependent children at home was
not unconstitutionally overbroad. See generally Deborah L. Rhode, Justice and Gender
( Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989), 29-50.
See, e.g., Andrews, 1989, 252-272; Shalev, 1989, 144; and Hill, 1990, 157-159. In his decision in Orange County ( California) Superior Court, Judge Richard N. Parslow awarded cus-