avenues of recourse. Let use use an analogy that I believe is appropriate. More women are injured, and often very much more grievously so, as a result of domestic violence than as a result of surrogacy. Yet the extent of domestic violence, and the serious harms that accrue to women as a result, do not motivate us to legally prohibit marriage or domestic partnerships. What we aim to do instead is to provide as many legal avenues and social structures as we can to enable women to leave battering relationships and seek redress for their injuries or to provide access to therapy that might stop the battering.
Similarly, what I propose in the case of surrogacy is not legal prohibition but a variety of policies that will warn women of the risks involved, make it possible for them to seek redress if their rights are violated during the process of functioning as a surrogate, help secure parental claims they do not wish to relinquish, and see that the interests of resulting children are protected.
Because I believe that both the benefits and the burdens of women's reproductive choices, whether as commercial or as gift surrogates or in the context of patriarchal relationships, are more alike than different, I think we should seek to devise legal solutions that would empower all women who are mothers. I believe that reforming our legal practices regarding custody in the ways I have suggested, and treating disputes over children who result from surrogacy arrangements as custody disputes, is a fair and principled way to protect the variety of parental claims that may arise and also the interests of the children involved. Legally recognizing a plurality of parental relationships may go a long way toward valuing and validating a variety of relationships coveted by both adults and children and away from viewing children as entities over whom adults should be driven to seek exclusive possession. 60